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European integration has affected regions in various ways and it has created 
economic winners and losers. Reform of European regional policy and the creation 
of the Structural Funds have drawn countries more closely into the EU policy 
process. Countries have formed a queue to enter the EU and get a share of the 
structural funds that EU gives out to member countries. This thesis examines 
Greece's experience as a member of the European Union (EU). While evaluating the 
Greek experience within the EU, we derive three significant policy lessons that apply 
both to similar countries, in particular Turkey, now on the queue to join in the club. 
First, countries that enter the EU must improve the structural deficiencies of their 
economies before entry in order to minimize the impact of increased competition 
after the removal of trade protection and trade barriers. In addition, they should 
follow domestic policies that maintain and promote their comparative advantage 
within the EU. Second, the ‘Convergence Criteria’ have proven to be a successful 
mechanism for countries with a poor policy record to achieve macroeconomic 
stability, as shown in the case of Greece when it demonstrated a clear will to join the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). This suggests that if there is a motivation the 
government can indeed better the macroeconomic balances of a certain country. 
Third, common EU policies can be very helpful in facilitating structural reforms in 
small economies. Yet, these policies must be continuously evaluated and improved 
so that their effectiveness could be maximized because conditions change and 
nothing remains the same in this rapidly changing world. 
 
 
Keywords: Greece-EU relations, Greece and the EU, Turco-Greek Dispute, EMU 
and Greece, Greece and Europeanization.  
  
 
 
Özet 
 
Avrupa Birliği’nin genişleme sürecinde kazançlı ve kaybeden bölgeler oluşmuştur. 
Avrupa Birliği reform paketi içerisindeki fonlar birçok ülkeyi Avrupa Birliği’ne 
girme çabası içerisine sokmuştur. Bu tez Avrupa Birliği’nin bir üyesi olan 
Yunanistan’ın entegrasyon sürecini incelemektedir. Yunanistan örneğini 
incelememizin nedeni Avrupa Birliği’ne girmek isteyen Balkan ülkeleri ve Türkiye 
Yunanistan’a yapısal olarak benzemektedirler. Yunanistan’ın entegrasyon süreci 
incelenirken üye olmak isteyen ülkelerin dikkat etmesi gereken üç husus 
bulunmaktadır. İlk olarak Avrupa Birliği’ne girmek isteyen ülkelerin kendi 
ekonomilerini yeterince güçlendirmeleri ve açık pazar ekonomisinde rekabet 
edebilmeleri gereklidir. Çünkü artık Yunanistan’ın ekonomisini ayakta tutan fonlar 
olmayacaktır. Ayrıca Kopenhag kriterleri bir yönden üye olmak isteyen ülkeler için  
bir şekilde makro ekonomik dengelerini düzeltmeleri için bir zorunluluk 
oluşturmaktadır. Son olarak ortak Avrupa Birliği  politikaları Avrupa Birliği’ne 
girmek isteyen ülkelerin legal ve politik yapılarını degiştirmekte faydalı olabilir. Bu 
tez Yunanistan’ın AB’ye entegrasyon sürecini ve mevcut durumu mukayeseli bir 
şekild de anlatmaktadır. 
 
Anahtar kelimeler: Yunanistan-Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri, Yuanistan ve Avrupa Birliği, 
Türk Yunan ilişkileri, Euro ve Yunanistan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis attempts at analyzing the Greece’s integration and accession to the EU. 
The reasons for which Greece chose full accession to the Community will be 
summed up in a historical order. The Greek accession and the integration process is a 
worthwhile example for the Balkan countries and Turkey who are in the queue to 
join the European club. The Greek case will give us an understanding of how 
difficult it is to become a EU state and also we will have an idea of how it is to be a 
European member state. The advantages and disadvantages of becoming a member 
will be grasped. In this context it will be easier to make a cost and benefit analysis 
for the candidate countries that are so willing to enter the EU, in particular for 
Turkey.  Particular attention will be paid to the impact Greece’s accession process 
with the EU on Turkey’s security relationship with Europe. The thesis will analyze 
the relations during the Cold War era and then it will discuss the reasons why we 
have seen a transformation in the fundamental parameters of the dispute in the 1990s, 
as the EU has turned out to become the new ‘platform’ for solution of the dispute of 
the Cyprus conflict.  
 
In formulating our view it is better to go back to history and make a thorough 
analyzes of how the EU came about and what was the motivation behind the making 
of it. Then it is better to move on to analyze and understand the Greek motivation 
behind the decision to become a full member of the EC.  The first chapter will dwell 
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on the long process of accession, so as not to miss any of the important aspects of 
this accession process. This chapter will start from Karamalis’s decision to apply to 
the EEC in July 1959. Form the beginning of Greece’s relations with the EEC, 
signing of the Athens Treaty in July 1961 and afterwards will be studied. Further the 
relentless struggle and the military coup in 1967 and the relations between Greece 
and the EU will be studied. The change in relations with Greece and the EU with the 
change of the Greek political structure will also be tackled in detail. Then the Greek 
accession to the EU in 1981 and the PASOK era will be analyzed. 
 
The second chapter will dwell upon the aftermath of the Cold War and it will mainly 
analyze how the parameters have changed. The effects of the transformation will be 
analyzed in depth. For instance, the new pace of the EU relations with Greece after 
the Cold War will be explained. In this chapter the Kostas Simitis era is quite 
significant and will be thoroughly analyzed and the change of policies and attitudes 
will be taken into account. There will also be a section in which transformed 
relations between Greece and EU will be explained. Hence, the beginning of a new 
era between Greece and the EU will be better understood when the decisions 
undertaken are carefully examined.  
 
Having studied the accession process of Greece into the EC, the third chapter will 
deal with the integration process that was slow and came about gradually into the 
agenda of Greek government. This integration process, especially, started increasing 
its pace during the Simitis government. First and foremost the macroeconomic 
effects of Greece’s accession to the EU will be studied in this chapter. Secondly, 
contemporary changes in government policy will be handled. Thirdly, the Customs 
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Union and its effects on the Greek Economy will be examined in great depth so as to 
understand its positive and negative effects on the Greek economy. Fourthly, trade in 
manufacturing and agricultural products and the implications of accession will be 
looked in depth in this chapter. Finally, the rough road to the Euro will be looked at. 
Various implications of Greece’s entry into European Monetary System (EMU) will 
also be examined in detail.  
 
In the fourth chapter the nature of the Europeanization process, firstly the 
contradictions between policies and, secondly, the performance will be questioned 
and studied. In this chapter the Greek Europeanization will be assessed in a three-
fold process, namely the governmental adaptation, political adaptation and strategic 
adaptation. In addition, the new problems created by Europeanization mainly, the 
redefinition of the imperatives, norms and logic will be studied. Later the limits of 
the Europeanization process, first clientelistic system, second the political culture 
will be tackled. Moreover, the Europeanization of Greece; interest politics and the 
crises of integration will be reconsidered.  
 
The fourth chapter concentrates on the foreign policy and security issues of the 
Greek integration process. In this chapter, the changes in Greece’s foreign policy 
after it became a EU member will be analyzed. The EU-Greece-Turkey triangle will 
be assessed and the consequences of being a EU member will be handled. After 
covering the most significant foreign policy issues for Greece then the thesis will 
deal with the security aspect of Greece’s EU membership.  In this context, the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defense 
Policy (ESDP) issues will be dealt with.  
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In conclusion, the admission of Greece and its integration process will be studied in 
this thesis and finally the lessons learned from the Greek case will be explained. The 
Greek case will be a basis for comparison for countries that desire to be a full 
member of the EU in, particular, Turkey. The comparison will be made bearing in 
mind the continuous changes in the conditions, thus the evaluation will be made in 
line with the changing conditions of the world. In other words, the study will not 
neglect the fact that the conditions when Greece became an EC member were 
different from today.  
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CHAPTER I: BEGINNING AND DEVELOPMENT OF GREECE’S 
RELATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
1.1.The Making of the EU: The union of Coal and Steel and Afterwards 
 
After the First World War the irreversible Communist revolution in Russia occurred 
and, later after the Second World War, Britain and France became dependent 
economically and militarily on the US. Thus, the original aims of the EEC lie in 
history.  It came about gradually, firstly, through union of Coal and Steel1 and then 
the EU was constructed stage by stage into today’s EU. It was believed that mutual 
interest sharing would lead to a desired ‘end product’ and create peace and prosperity 
in Europe that was mostly craved for after the two destructive world wars.  
 
The destination of the union at the start gave a mixed impression whether it was to be 
a union to solve the Alsace-Lorraine problem between Germany and France or 
advance to a higher degree of economic and institutional integration, including a 
monetary union and a common defense force, eventually leading to a political union. 
Twofold motivation was clear, firstly, to contain Germany and minimize the risk of a 
                                                 
1 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Art 1. The treaty signed April 18, 
1951, and was written in French. The English translation does describe “objective” or “purposes” as 
such. Article 2 states that the “mission the Community is “to contribute to the expansion of the 
economy, the development of employment and improvement of standards of living in participant 
States, of a common market as defined in Article 4”. The “ common market there defined negatively 
by declaring what is abolished and prohibited: import export duties quotas; practices discriminating 
among producers, buyers tending to divide or exploit the market. Article 3 specifies market goals- the 
regularity of supply, equality of access, lowest prices commensurate with necessary amortization   and 
normal return, and rational development of resources. For general analysis of the treaty, see Gerhard 
Bebr, “The European Coal and Steel Community a Political and Legal Innovation”, 63 Yale Law 
Journal 1 (1953).   
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rearmed and economically powerful Germany to arise again. Secondly, a basic factor 
was to integrate the divided Europe into a single economic and political entity, 
although it was not openly discussed at that time.  In the 1960s, all the political and 
economic objectives seemed to be on the right course. “Military power had been not 
only eliminated but forgotten as means of settling disputes within the Community”2. 
 
 Germany and France had found ground for new means of settling disputes with each 
other and animosity between these countries seemed have ended. The Treaty of 
Rome3 had indeed managed to integrate the economy between the member countries. 
By establishing trade protection where appropriate against non-member countries by 
way of common tariff, the members of the club managed to create the “other”, and 
by so doing they could create an outsider, eliminating animosities among themselves.  
The political leaders of the Six, namely France, Germany, the Benelux countries, had 
already agreed on crucial issues and reached a final draft. Not only were the issues of 
conflict were resettled in Europe between member countries but also Soviet 
territorial expansion had been contained. There is no way of judging how much the 
attainment of these objectives was due to the Treaty of Rome. “Economic growth 
had accelerated to fast rates before the Community was founded”4. Thus, the attained 
level of prosperity could well be thanks to the US assistance to Europe that were 
dropped from the US aid lorries, as was democracy after the Second World War5. 
Nevertheless, the economic progress was facilitated by the continued expansion of 
the world economy as well as through a heavy inflow of laborers from the 
                                                 
2 Seers Dudley& Vaitsas Constantine, The Second Enlargement of the EEC, p.11.  
3 Treaty of Rome which was effective on April 15 1960 aimed to achieve a single integrated market 
possessing the following features; free movement between Member State of goods unimpeded by 
customs duties and quantitative restrictions, freedom of labour, freedom of services, freedom of 
capital, and trade protection where appropriate against non-member countries by way of common 
tariff. For more details see, Alex Roney, “EC/EU Fact Book”, Clays Ltd. (1990).   
4 Ibid, p. 13. 
5 Norman, Stone, Bilkent Magazine, p. 9 (2004). 
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Mediterranean. Economic growth was fast and this in turn raised living standards 
well above the pre-war levels. Community’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
raised the degree of self-sufficiency in food, and it reduced community’s dependence 
on the outside world.  Some maintain that, “much of the credit for the success of the 
EEC should be attributed to ‘background’ factors: the member countries share the 
same European tradition, have a sizeable Catholic population, are in a similar stage 
of economic development, have a similar stage of economic development, have a 
similar civilization, and so forth”5.  
 
Beginning from the 1950s with the Treaty of Paris (1952) and the emergence of the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the two Treaties of Rome (1958) set 
up the European Economic Community (EEC) and the establishment of the Euratom. 
The European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community 
and the European Economic Community all shared the same institutions in common, 
which consisted of the Council of Ministers that takes the Community’s decision, the 
Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. It is clear that the 
community had not only an economic objective but it had also a political goal right 
from the start.  Furthermore, all these institutions paving the way to the European 
Union, indeed, created willingness for other countries to join in. The second 
enlargement came about when the countries such as Great Britain, Denmark and 
Ireland wanted to join the club.   
 
In the mid 1970s there seemed no great difficulty about expanding even further and 
accepting the unequal partners into the EEC. The so-called unequal partners, namely 
                                                 
5 This article was written while the author was a research associate of the Institute of War and Peace 
Studies at Columbia University. For more information see, Amitai Etzioni, European Unification a 
Strategy of Change, p. 32 (1963). 
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Greece, Portugal and Spain showed a desire to apply to the community. Greece as 
well as the other two countries wished to join an association that reflected a level of 
institutional development beyond a certain limit that these countries had achieved6.  
 
First, the three Southern European countries appeared to possess comparative 
advantage in activities that were declining and problematic in the rest of the 
Community, namely textiles, clothing, steel and shipbuilding. Second, the 
Community desired to add the field of agricultural structural surpluses of south to the 
existing surpluses of northern products. Third, all Southern European countries had 
had fast growing and seemingly sustainable economic basis. However, there were 
some qualifications: got the better of economic worries. Many believed that the 
divergent development patters of underdeveloped countries such as Greece would 
put a brake on the economic growth process of the EEC. The third enlargement 
received enough support from the six who decided to enlarge the union by 
integrating the new comers into the Community, in a step-by-step process. 
Nevertheless, based on the economic consequences of enlargement of the unequal 
partners there were some doubts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Keith R. Legg, John M. Roberts, Modern Greece, p. 200 (1997). 
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1.2. Karamanlis decision to apply to the EEC in July 1959 
 
Today, almost all Greeks seem to approve fuller integration of Greece to the 
European Union. However, at the time when Constantinos Karamanlis decided to 
apply to the EEC in July 1959 there were many who opposed it. Many industrialists 
rejected the idea on the grounds that they were accustomed to the protective shield of 
tariffs and quotas. They did not want to shift to the more competitive conditions and 
risk their potential markets by joining the EEC. Public feelings were not similar; on 
the one hand, there were those that did not consider themselves as part of Europe 
because they considered themselves on part of Hellenic civilization. The others 
symbolized the country’s advance from the Balkan backwardness to European 
sophistication7.   
 
 Karamanlis viewed Greece as a bridge, in his words ‘linking –what was then- the 
Common Market to the Mediterranean’8. He could see what sort of benefits Greece 
would have if they moved closer to the Community. In that respect, “Karamanlis was 
one of the great European visionaries of the past century”9. His primary objective 
was to gain associate status that would be accompanied by a long period of 
adjustment. In those days, Greece could not hope to become a full member of the 
                                                 
7 D. George Kousoulas, Modern Greece, p. 249 (1987). 
8 Speech of Constantinnos Karamalis at the signing of the Accord admitting Greece to the EEC, for 
the quotation see the address by the president of the European People’s Party Dr. Wilfried Martens at 
the inauguration of the Constantinos Karamalis hall in the European Parliament, p. 1, (2003). 
9 Karamanlis’s address at the European Parliament for the quotation see the address by the president 
of the European People’s Party Dr. Wilfried Martens at the inauguration of the Constantinos 
Karamalis hall in the European Parliament, p. 1, (2003). 
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community because it lagged behind the six EEC partners in terms of economic and 
social development. Karamanlis recognized that Greece was an unequal partner, 
therefore, considerable efforts were needed to modernize Greek industry, and 
structural reforms were necessary in not only the public sector but also the private 
sector through the Greek economy was not in bad shape and was rapidly developing 
since the 1950s10.  
 
Becoming a close partner of Europe promised the country’s emancipation from the 
monopoly of Anglo-American influence, which was not greatly inspired by the 
Greeks. After the Second World War, the US had assisted the Greek economy as it 
did many others to get back on its own feet. However, the Greeks did not appreciate 
this, nor was American assistance very much appreciated by other European 
countries that decided to get together and form a Community. In this sense, it was 
seen by several Greek pro-Marketers to look to the Community for some sort of 
defense and security identity protecting them from the US11.  
 
The six signed the Treaty of Rome12 establishing the European Economic 
Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM) in 
1957. Right after this treaty was signed in 1959 Karamanlis applied to become an 
associate member in the Community because of the reasons stated above. Not long 
after this application Karamanlis reached his goal and the treaty granting association 
membership was signed in Athens on July 10, 1961.  
 
 
                                                 
10 The Times, 11Dec. 1979. 
11 Carol and Kenneth J. Twitchett, Building Europe: Britain’s Parners in the EEC, p. 232 (1981). 
12 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/selected/livre2_c.html 
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1.3. Signing of the Athens Treaty in July 1961 and Afterwards 
 
Four agreements of association with non-member states were concluded since the 
establishment of the three European Communities, namely the European Coal and 
Steel Community in 1952 and the European Economic Community and the European 
Atomic Energy Community in 195813. The Associate Agreements of the European 
Community was first signed by the ECSC and the United Kingdom on December 21 
195414. The other associate agreement s was signed with Greece in 1961, with a 
number of newly established African states and with Turkey in 1963.  
 
These association agreements had economic and even political implications on the 
external relations of both member states and non-member states that needed to be 
tackled. First, the existing pattern of international trade was likely to be altered by 
some of these agreements. Second, with the new agreements a shift in the 
distribution of power in the international arena was expected to come about. Third, 
the legal base of the agreement and the long range and intermediate term objectives 
needed to be explored.  
 
                                                 
13 For the texts of the   ECSC, EEC and the Euratom Treaties, see Treaty Establishing the European 
Coal and Steel Community (Luxembourg: High Authority, n.d.); Treaty Establishing the European 
Economic Community (Brussels: Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and 
Euratom, n.d.); and the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
(Brussels: Secretariat of the Interim Committee for the Common Market and Euroatom n.d.). The 
member states are France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.  
14 For the text of the ECSC-United Kingdom Agreement, see Publications Department of ECSC, 
Agreement Concerning the Relations between the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Luxembourg, n.d.) (Hereinafter cited s the 
ECSC-United Kingdom Agreement). 
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The legal foundation of the Association Agreement stated in these accords is Article 
238 of the EEC Treaty15. In addition, the negotiations of rights and obligations 
stipulated in Article 238 were in the hands of the EEC Commission, as in EU today, 
but it was the Council of Ministers that acted by means of a unanimous vote and after 
consulting the European Parliament, it concluded the agreement16. The member 
states are contracting parties to the Greek Association Agreement despite the fact 
that for Article 238 authorizes the Community, as an international legal person17.  
The necessity for the joint venture was because of the Greek Associate Agreement 
that the accord to be useful and effective it had to contain an undertaking on the part 
of the Community that might in some respect lie outside its competence as stipulated 
by the EEC Treaty18. 
 
What were the objectives of the Association Agreements then? The Association 
Agreement is nothing more then a conclusion of a trade or commercial accord; 
however, it did not cover the acquisition of full membership19. The Three Treaties 
formed by the EEC does not give a specific definition of objectives of the 
                                                 
15 See Article 238 of the EEC Treaty, this Article stipulates that the Community “ may conclude with 
a third country, a union of States or an international organization agreement creating an association 
embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special procedures”. 
16 See Article 228 of the EEC Treaty. The requirement of consultation must not be understood to mean 
that the Council is bound by the advice of the Parliament. The Council in fact did not consult the 
Parliament before concluding the Greek Agreement. Yet, in order to comply at the spirit of Article 
238 a reservation was added to the Council representative’s signature that declared that the 
Community would be obligated by either of the agreements only after “the procedures described by 
the EEC Treaty, particularly the consultation of the European Parliament, had been completed”. The 
Parliament strongly objected to this method of applying Article 238. See Europaisches Parliament, 
Sitzungsdocumente 1961-1962, Document 61, September 18, 1961, p. 4, 5; and also the resolution of 
the Parliament approving the Turkish Agreement in Amtsblatt der Eropaischen Gemeninschaften 
(hereinafter cited as Amtsblatt), December 12, 1963 (Vol. 6), p. 2906/63-2908/63. In support of the 
Council’s procedures, see Thomas Oppermann, “ Die Assoziierung Griechenlands mit Volkrrecht, 
1962 (Vol. 22, No.3), p. 498-502.   
17 See Article 210 and 211 of the EEC Treaty. For discussions of the meaning of these two Articles 
and problems connected to it with the international legal personality of the Community, see Werner 
Feld, “The Association Agreement of the European Communities”, p. 225 (1965). 
18 For example, especially for the financial aid undertakings see Article 228 (1). The problem of who 
would be the  
19 Werner Feld, The Association Agreements of the European Community, p.227 (1985 ). 
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Association Agreement. There are therefore just assumptions that base it on an 
objective. It is said to most probably be to extend to a notion stating that it is a union 
desiring to include the associated members, for those European associates to join the 
Community, as full members. For those states that are willing but are not able to 
fulfill the economic conditions of accession, the customs union was considered as a 
secondary alternative while getting prepared for the full membership20. Another 
objective that is been defined by some scholars is that the Association Agreement 
was to create a free trade area, where customs duties between the Community and the 
associate member would be abolished, yet no common external tariffs would be 
established21.  
 
The provisions of the EEC and Euratom Treaties stating the principle between the 
rights and obligations of the association partner are also significant. The associated 
state not only enjoys the benefits of eliminating interior customs duties and the 
external tariffs but it has to comply with certain restrictive rules of the EEC Treaty 
such as the regulations on competition considered to guarantee a fair market in the 
Community’s boundaries.  
 
The long-term objective of the Agreement with Greece was “to promote a continuous 
and balanced strengthening of commercial and economic relations between the 
contracting parties with full consideration of the need to ensure the accelerated 
development of the economy of Greece (Turkey) as well as the elevation of the level 
                                                 
20 Only European states may become members of any of the Communities (Article 98 of the ECSC 
Treaty, Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, Article 205 of the Euratom Treaty).  
21 Werner Feld, The Association Agreements of the European Community, p.227 (1985). 
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of employment and of the living standards of the Greek (Turkish) people”22. In this 
respect the objectives of the two associated members, namely Greece and Turkey 
were put in the same category, however, these countries were more far reaching than 
those of the ESCS Agreement with the United Kingdom23.  In this end, the associated 
members had to establish customs union with the EEC and to harmonize their 
economic policies. “A tentative long-range objective of both Agreements is the 
accession of Greece and Turkey to full membership in the Community”24. 
Nevertheless, since the levels of economic development in Greece and Turkey were 
considered to be different, in turn, the regulations of the customs union were not the 
same. In the Agreement as the Agreement was in force, the then customs duties 
would be abolished gradually25.  Nonetheless, there existed exceptions to this 
principle; firstly, the member states were required to cut their tariffs immediately on 
imports from Greece to the level already attained by the Community. Secondly, 
Greece was allowed to apply new duties during the first twelve years in order to 
protect its young industries. Thirdly, Greece was permitted to “space out” its tariff 
reductions for a number of productions over 22 years26.  
 
Last but not least, in order to protect some of the agricultural products that is vital for 
the Greek economy, for instance, the tobacco, raisins, olives, rosin and some other 
products, the Community agreed not to change these without the consent of Greece27. 
The fundamental principle of such a process of harmonization of agricultural policies 
                                                 
22 Articles 2(1) of both the Greek and Turkish Agreements for more information see Werner Feld, The 
Association Agreements of the European Community, p.230 (1985).. 
23 Werner Feld, The Association Agreements of the European Community, p.230 (1985).. 
24 Articles 2 (2) and 72 of the Greek Agreement and Articles 4 (1) and 28 of the Turkish Agreement 
for further information see ibid. p. 230. .  
25 The Association Agreement covers all trade between Greece and the Community except coal, steel, 
coke, iron, ore, and scrap, Articles 6 and 69 of the Greek Agreement see ibid. p. 230.  
26 Articles 12, 15, and 18 and Annex I of the Greek Agreement see ibid p. 230.  
27 Article 20 (1-2) and Protocol 10 of the Greek Agreement see ibid. p. 231. 
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was to assure equal treatment of similar products of member states and Greece within 
the Community’s markets28. Furthermore, with regard to economic policy, there were 
some detailed arrangements made29. The coordination effort was to be directed by 
the general principles of the EEC Treaty and to construct a “sound basis for Greece’s 
balance of payments”. The Greek Agreement had detailed provisions listed as stated 
above30. 
 
1.4. The relentless struggle and the military coups in 1967 and the relations 
between Greece and the EU 
 
On April 21, 1967, the military assumed political leadership and the relations 
between Greece and EEC “froze” when military coups dominated Greek politics 
from 1967 to 19734 until democracy was restored. Yet, what prompted the military 
to intervene in Greek politics? What was the rationale of the military coup of 1967? 
In order to answer these questions it is necessary to understand Greek history and 
politics and then examine the conditions under which the military took an active role 
in Greek politics. On the other hand, it is, also, significant to explore the factor that 
deterred the military from the politics of Greece.  
                                                 
28 Article 32 and 33 of the Greek Agreement, Articles 34-43 and Annexes 2 and 3 provide the detailed 
regulations for the harmonization process, see ibid. pp. 232.  
29 For details, see Article 58-64 of the Greek Agreement. An interesting provision concerning the 
harmonization of the foreign trade policies of the Community and Greece deals with the case of a 
third country applying to join the Community either as an associate member or a full member. In such 
an event the Community and Greece are to consult each other in order to settle jointly the new 
relations between Greece and the future associate or member with full consideration of both Greek 
and EEC interests. This provision was applied when the agreement with Turkey was being negotiated, 
may cause difficulties should the Community want to conclude additional association agreements with 
other Mediterranean countries, see ibid. pp. 232.   
30 The Turkish Agreement lacks the detailed provisions of the Greek Agreement regarding the gradual 
establishment of the customs union because these details cannot be spelled out until it is determined 
that Turkey is ready for the introduction of the customs union and because the necessary provisions 
must take into consideration the economic and legal situation that will exist at that time, for details see 
ibid. pp. 232. 
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The old quarrels in Greece had always been between Venizelists and anti-
Venizelists, in other words, it was between the supporters of the republic and the 
monarchy. This picture had gradually changed but had been overlaid by an even 
more significant division that was between the communists and anti-communists31. 
The Russian regime was starting to influence the Greek domestic politics as well.  
The Russian regime had also quite an effect on the Balkan countries domestic 
politics and these countries became a Socialist country one by one in due time.  
 
Resources were devoted to military to the containment of ‘the enemy within’ rather 
than to repairing the ravages of war and occupation. In turn, by 1949 Greek military 
and security forces were approximately a quarter of a million. The American aid had 
not been spent on economic development and “channeled instead to military 
objectives”32. Military obtained a significant power and the Greek military was 
willing and able to intervene into politics when demanded.  
 
 It is necessary to mention American dominance in Greek politics, where there were 
claims that only “few major military, economic or, indeed, political decisions could 
be taken without American approval”.33 For instance, the result of the elections in 
1951, when the Greek Rally headed by Marshal Papagos, the commander in chief 
during the later stages of the civil war, replaced the People’s Party and United 
Democratic Left, which was an outlawed communist party, got some of the votes, 
upset the American ambassador, who did not hesitate to “publicly threaten a 
reduction in US aid, (of which Greece had been the recipient of almost billions of 
                                                 
31 Clogg, Richard, A Concise History of Greece, pp. 145 (1939). 
32 Ibid. pp. 146. 
33 Ibid. pp. 146. 
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dollars over previous five years), unless the voting system was to be changed from 
proportional to majority”34. It was no secret that the Greek economy was heavily 
dependent on the US aid. It soon was apparent that the primary objective of Greek 
government was the containment of communism both at domestic and international 
levels.  
 
There were reasons behind such an American policy; in fact, countries that had fallen 
under communist control surrounded Greece: Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were 
under the communist regime now. Therefore, in 1952, both Greece and Turkey were 
admitted to NATO. In 1958, the communist party emerged as the main opposition 
party, the United Democratic Left had exploited widespread resentment over the 
Cyprus issue when NATO allies did not back the Greek case as much as the Greeks 
wished. This worried both the US administration and Karamanlis, who was declared 
as King Paul’s successor and who had won the elections in 1956 and in 1958 and 
increased his majority in parliament35. 
 
Nonetheless, Karamanlis did not face too much trouble until his luck changed when 
the centre parties managed to come together under one party, namely the umbrella of 
the Centre Union lead by Georgios Papandreou. Papandreou had achieved his 
objective to cut down United Democratic Left but he could not replace Karamanlis. 
In 1958 Papandreou attained a narrow victory over Karamanlis. Papandreou’s 
economic policies threatened price stability that achieved during the first Karamanlis 
era. Moreover, the army began to regard it as the protector of the national values and 
decided to protect the country from dangerous left wing influences.  
                                                 
34 Ibid. pp. 147. 
35 Ibid. pp.151. 
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When things were getting worse, Papandreou decided to exert full political power 
over the armed forces. Yet he could not attain his goal when his own defense 
minister thwarted him. “The crisis reached a climax in July 1965 when the prime 
minister sought royal assent to taking over the ministry of defense in addition to the 
premiership”36. The King Constantine, who was the son of King Paul, refused his 
request. The political turmoil continued and uncertainty served a group of junior 
officers to execute a coup that faced no organized resistance.   
 
The coup was lead and engineered by Papadopoulos whom had set up a secret 
organization called the Union of Greek Officers (EENA)37 and assumed power in 
1967. He managed to become the dictator of Greece between 1967 and 1973 even 
though the military junta faced some trouble in justifying its action. The army’s 
rationale for intervention was that it was grounded not on the social and political 
milieu of that country but within the regional and international political and 
ideological struggle38. The officers tried to justify their action by stressing the 
inability of the politicians and the king to take necessary measures in order to solve 
the political and national crises in the mid 1960s39. The new regime was 
authoritarian40: not only did the military assume constitutional, executive, and 
legislative powers but also issued a number of legislative degrees. “Promising the 
                                                 
36 Ibid. pp.161. 
37 A. Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint (London, 1971), pp. 189-190. This union (EENA) was 
opposed to IDEA, a secret organization of officers set up in 1945.  
38 G. A. Kourvetaris, Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics, pp. 137 (1999) 
39 Ibid. pp.138. 
40 S.G. Xydis, “Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-1973”, Political Science Quarterly, (89) 3 
(1974) pp.508. 
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regeneration of the ‘Greece of the Greek Christians’ it chose as its symbol the 
phoenix rising from its ashes, with a soldier at attention in its breast”41.  
 
The 1952 constitution was replaced in 1968, which constitution did not overrule the 
powers of the king, but limited royals powers. It increased the powers of the armed 
forces and “it vested the armed forces with the role of guardians of the constitution 
and of the political and social status quo”42. Martial law was lifted in 1971 from the 
rural areas and it remained limited to Greater Athens in 1972. 
 
In 1973 Papadopoulos reserved powers not only in defense sectors but also in foreign 
affairs and public order. In addition, he shared legislative powers with the 
Parliament. The period of the Revolution of April 21, 1967 was officially declared to 
have come to an end. The new constitution allowed a multiparty system; it also 
called for its implication by the end of 1974. These were optimistic signs that an all-
civilian cabinet was about to take over in Greece again43. 
 
On November 25, 1973, a military coup under the leadership of Brigadier-General 
Dimitrios Ioannidis who was the leader of ESA, in other words the military police, 
was carried out and another military officer replaced Papadopoulos. However, this 
time he enjoyed limited powers through a return to the “Revolution of April 21, 
1967” was proclaimed with this military coup. The election plans were cancelled and 
a new political struggle broke out among the members of the former Union of Young 
                                                 
41 Ioannis Kapodistrias, the first President of Greec, had used the phoenix as a sybol of free Greece. 
He also had invoked the precept of salus populi suprema lex esto when setting aside the constitution 
of Troezene (1827) and establishing in 1828 a quasi-dictatorship.  
42 S.G. Xydis, “Coups and Countercoups in Greece, 1967-1973”, Political Science Quarterly, (89) 3 
(1974) pp.508. 
43 Ibid. pp.509. 
 20 
Greek Officer44.  Once again the coup was extended to civil life and a need for the 
coup to justify itself politically and beneficial ties to the society45.  The change of 
junta coincided with a deterioration of relations with Turkey. This was when Turkish 
side claimed for the right to prospect for oil found in the Greece’s claimed 
continental self, in parts of the Aegean Sea. After this event took place Greece and 
Turkey began mobilizing, however, Greek mobilization did not prove to be serious 
due to the fact that there was serious trouble in attaining command and order 
relationship in newly formed junta. The military commanders refused to obey 
Ioannidis’s orders to attack Turkey46. It is, yet, significant to mention here that 
during the same year the Cyprus issue came to the forefront and the Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus took place. This intervention was actually one of the main 
reasons that forced the old military junta to collapse and the ensuing chaos came to 
an end where Mr. Karamanlis who was in exile came back and restored democracy to 
Athens. Thus, the junta came to an end because there was no domestic support within 
and not a friend without. The old military leaders had no choice but to call on 
Konstantinos Karamanlis to establish democracy in Greece. On 24 July 1974 
Karamanlis came back and restored democracy for good in Greece.  
 
As he assumed power the Greek and EEC relations began normalizing. 
Normalization of relations with Greece and the EU began with the change of Greek 
political structure. Karamanlis did indeed manage to ensure a remarkable transition 
                                                 
44 Ibid. pp.509. 
45 A. Roberts, “Civil Resistance to Military Coups”, Journal of Peace Research, (12) 1 (1975) pp. 
19. 
46 R. Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, pp. 168 (1992)  
 
 
 
 
 21 
from dictatorship to democracy. The political system functioned more effectively 
than ever before for the next seven years. This progress made it possible for Greece 
to join the EEC in 1981. Thus, Karamanlis had achieved its aims to be the part of the 
club with some delay. Karamanlis for long believed that “Greece belongs to the 
West”, on the other hand, Andreas Papandreou, stated, “Greece belongs to the 
Greeks”47. These two opposing statements were significant in demonstrating the 
future relations between the EEC and Greece. 
 
It is important to focus on the reasons why Karamanlis was so keen on joining the 
EEC. This can be summed up as follows: first, Greece considered the Community to 
be the institutional framework within which stability could be brought into its 
democratic political system and institutions. Second, Greece tried to enforce its 
independence and position within the regional and international system as well as its 
"power to negotiate", in particular, with regard to its relations with Turkey, because 
after the which intervention in Cyprus (July 1974) freeze beyond to look for security 
guarantees from any quarter. In turn, Greece also sought to loosen its strong post-war 
dependence upon the US. Third, accession to the Community was regarded by 
Karamanlis as a powerful factor that would contribute to the development and 
modernization of the Greek economy and Greek society. Last but not least, 
Karamanlis desired, as a European country, to have "presence" in, and an impact on, 
the process towards European integration and the European model48. 
 
 
                                                 
47 Ibid. pp.179. 
48 http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/greece/history.html. 
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1.5. Greek accession to the EU in 1981 and the PASOK era 
 
In January 1st 1981 Greece formally joined the European Community (EU) after all 
the efforts of Karamanlis. The same year, a socialist government came into power. 
The Pan Hellenistic Socialist Party had been very much against further integration 
with the West. The reason for its opposition was because this would “consolidate a 
peripheral role of the county as a satellite in the capitalist system”49. Its agenda 
focused on the dissimilarities of political objectives between Greece and the 
European Union. They followed an anti-European and an anti-Western policy. 
Especially through 1980s this attitude caused Greece to follow distant foreign policy 
choices and moves, which strained the relations between Greece and its European 
partners on common foreign policy50. 
 
 PASOK could neither get NATO and nor the US support against Turkey. Therefore, 
they concluded a non-aggression pact with Bulgaria and tried to establish good 
relations with a Warsaw Pact country51. This new policy of Prime Minister Andreas 
Papandreou, vis a vis the Turkish threat lead to strain the relations between Greece 
and the European Community (EU) members. The aim of this policy adjustment was 
to internationalize the Cyprus and the Aegean disputes52. This policy proved not to 
be successful and the aim of internalizing these issues did not reach its target. 
However it is necessary to note that during these days the EC was not seen as a 
strong institution nor was it not seen as an organization with any capacity to impose 
                                                 
49 Panos Kazakos, Historical Review, pp. 5. 
50 Panayiotis Ioakimidis, Countradictions in the Europeanization Process, (1996) pp.31-49. 
51  For more information see, Susannah Verney, from the ‘special relationship’ to Europeanism: 
PASOK and the EC, 1981-89, in Richard Clogg, The Populist Decade, pp. 28-47.   
52 Gökakın Özlem Behice, The Turco-Greek Dispute and Turkey’s relations with the European Union, 
Bilkent, (2000) pp. 51.  
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sanctions on Turkey53. Moreover, they did not believe that EC could guarantee their 
security interests in the region against Turkey. Furthermore, in 1982 Greece 
presented a memorandum to the EC Commission that indicated that Greece wished 
to join the EC, but under certain conditions. It deemed to get certain exceptions from 
the common market arrangements54.  
 
This particular memorandum became the basis for Greece’s cooperation and 
integration with EC. In mid-1980s PASOK government changed its attitude from a 
hostile anti-European Union and anti-Western posture to a more amenable one 
towards the EC. The Greek Government had realized the advantage of membership 
in the EC as a lever to convince Turkey that Turkish EC relations would not improve 
in any respect unless they approved it. This approval was tied to the resolution of the 
Cyprus and the Aegean issues55. This won one of the reasons why Greece supported 
the supranational elements in the EC, and gave full support to the communities 
developing foreign and defense policies. In short, Greece utilized well its power and 
prestige in the EU against Turkey during the mid 1980s and 1990s56. There was a lot 
of lobbying from the Greek side in the European Council of Ministers in order to get 
support to assist them in reaching their aims and getting the upper hand in their 
relations with Turkey. 
 
The end of the Cold War offered Greece an opportunity for new foreign policy 
exercises. For instance, Greece rediscovered the Balkans and pushed the countries in 
                                                 
53 Ibid. pp.51. 
54 For further information see, Memorandum, in Journal of European Communities, (1982) pp. 187-
193. 
55For further guidance see, Prodromos Yannas, The Greek Factor in the EC-Turkey Relations, (1985) 
pp. 215-223. 
56 Gökakın Özlem Behice, The Turco-Greek Dispute and Turkey’s relations with the European Union, 
Bilkent, (2000) pp. 52.  
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the region to find a role for itself in the EU. Until then, the EU meant a generous 
inflow of cash, and a political good example. On the other hand, it also seemed to be 
Greece’s only chance of breaking its isolation. Greece tried to improve its position 
by playing a significant role in integrating the Balkans into the EU. But the ethnic 
policies Athens pursued was likely to create trouble. The Macedonian problem 
caused Greece to become an even more marginal member in the European Union. 
Jacques Delors, the president of the European Commission at the same time period, 
sent a letter to Andreas Papandreou warning him to put an end to his unethical 
behavior towards Macedonia, otherwise Greece was threatened to be taken to the 
European Court. Delors even mentioned, “He would be happy to see Greece leave”57. 
The Greek blockade towards Macedonia aimed at changing its flag and constitution 
in ways the Greeks insisted upon was no good news in the EU. The actions violated 
Greece’s obligations to its EU partners under the Maastrict and Rome treaties. There 
were lots of criticisms of the Greek attitude at this period Greece was criticized to act 
like immortals and the Greek gods. It’s blockade of Macedonia illustrated how 
dangerous Mr. Papandreou’s “Olympian attitude” could be. 58 
 
This period is characterized by strong doubts about certain aspects of European 
integration. All this was coupled with the objective to “re-determine the country’s 
position within the community by means of establishing a ‘special regime’ of 
relations and regulations”59. As stated above, in March 1982 Greece, for this 
purpose, submitted a Memorandum asking for additional divergence from 
implementing certain community policies as well as further economic support in 
order to restructure Greek economy. The Greek Government could not manage to get 
                                                 
57 The Economist, Elsewhere in the Balkans, (1994) pp. 59. 
58 The Economist, When Gods Nod, (1994) pp. 52. 
59 http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/greece/history.html 
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this Memorandum accepted, the European Commission was only prepared to 
acknowledge the second request and fund it, and that was to be met through the 
Integrated Mediterranean Programs (IMPs) accepted in 1985. The IMP was 
considered to be much more significant than the additional funds granted to Greece 
because they introduced an effort towards structural policy development shaped in 
1988 with the new structural policy60. No matter how much tension Greece and the 
EU went through during this period, yet, at the end of the day, the Greek 
Government did manage to get a degree of benefits out of the harsh times it had with 
the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Ibid. pp. 2. 
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CHAPTER II: GREECE AND THE EU IN THE NEW ERA AFTER THE END 
OF THE COLD WAR 
 
2.1. The New Pace of EU relations with Greece after the Cold War 
 
The end of the Cold War brought with it its own troubles and it carried a new 
potential for new kinds of conflicts, for instance, long-standing ethnic animosities 
mushroomed in the Balkans. Most of the Balkans was ruled under the communist 
regime, the collapse of which created a strategic and ideological vacuum. Thus, “the 
primary national security policy of Greece was to safeguard its territorial integrity 
and to protect its democratic system and values”61. In order to secure its interest 
Greece sought to integrate its policies with those of its EU partners, more than ever 
before.  
 
Nevertheless, since late 1991 the highly emotional issue for Greece, namely the 
independence of Slavic Macedonia diverted the country from this policy. In the 
1990s there was immense trouble over the issue between Greece and EU, due to 
Greece’s unilateral embargo against FYROM. These radical actions provoked a 
reaction that was as radical as the action. Literally, the action provoked sharp 
disapproval and threats of legal action by the EU. Moreover, Greece’s unwillingness 
                                                 
61 http://greece.russiansabroad.com/country_page.aspx?page=227 
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to facilitate NATO air strikes on Serbia and its sympathetic attitude towards the Serb 
and their non-humanitarian actions exacerbated the Greek EU tensions.  
Therefore, Greek efforts to deepen ties with the EU faced obstacles and complicated 
not only Greece’s ties to EU but also it caused tensions with Greece’s relations in 
NATO.  
During this period, the policy Greece pursued with regard to the EU was 
characterized by the gradual adoption of stronger pro-integration positions. 
Especially, starting from 1988 on, Greece began not only to support the “federal” 
integration model but also the development of joint policy in new departments, 
namely education, health, and environment, the strengthening of supra-national 
institutions, for instance, the Commission and the Parliament. Some member states 
tried to develop a joint foreign and security policy for the Union but inconsistencies 
remained in both in the field of economy, Greece was diverging from the average 
“community” development level, and the political sector, with the problem caused by 
the FYROM question of Macedonia enraged itself from the rest of the EU name 
tension to be defused when the interim Agreement was signed in 1993. Meanwhile, 
Greece began to focus on the resolution of Cyprus question in accordance with its 
wishes: it started to project as its main goal the securing of Cyprus' accession to the 
European Community. To that end, it supported and backed the Nicosia Government 
in the latter's application for accession, submitted in June 199062. 
 
 
 
                                                 
62 http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/greece/history.html 
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2.2. The Simitis era and the change of policies and attitudes 
 
When Simitis won the elections and succeeded power, in 1996, Greece’s economy 
was still in bad shape, however, in this period attitudes changed. A new foreign 
policy towards the EU was initiated. Greek government, finally, started talking in the 
European diplomacy language. Many examples can be demonstrated to prove this 
point. For instance, Greek foreign affairs undersecretary Yannos Kranidiotis said, 
“The EU will serve as an umbrella which would give the necessary guarantees to all 
citizens of Cyprus”63. On the other hand, Greece declared it would block the EU 
enlargement if it did not accept to bring in the Greek Cypriots into the European 
club. No matter how much the Greeks try to change their diplomatic language they 
still attired threatening declarations once in a while. Greece, furthermore, claimed to 
play a new role in the Balkans considering it the most stable and most politically and 
economically advanced country in the area64.  Their aim was to de balkanize the 
Balkans by, firstly, empowering the region that was historically handicapped due to 
the Cold War and communism. Secondly, they supported cooperation in the region. 
In conclusion, they intended to integrate the region into the wider European family. 
In the same fashion, Mr. Simitis stressed that Greece favored of Turkey’s accession 
into the EU, on condition that Turkey should accept the authority of the European 
court. In addition, Turkey should withdraw its claims to the islet Imia Kardak. 
Finally, the issue of the Aegean continental shelf could also be sent to The Hague65. 
These issues were “the strongest diplomatic card which Greece can deal against its’ 
                                                 
63 Gittman Robert J., Greek Foreign Policy, Europe, (1997) pp. 20. 
64 Ibid. pp.16. 
65 President & Prime Minister, Turkey and Greece, (1997) pp. 20. 
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archenemy Turkey” stated Prof. Cheistodoulos Yalourides a professor at the Athens 
University66. 
 
The Öcalan case was a Greek tragedy thus the Greek and the European relations 
were strained when Öcalan was captured. However, this only showed “the hypocrisy 
of fellow EU members now “demanding” an explanation of Greece’s actions”67. This 
situation did not last far too long, and the relations bettered with Greece and the EU 
in a short while and the situation has altered greatly in the recent years. Greece is 
now receiving praise from Europeans for its moderation in its foreign policy68.  
 
Growing awareness in the deadlock created a shift in Greek’s relations with the EU. 
Over time Greece has realized the benefits of being an EU member and it adjusted its 
policies in order to gain as much as possible from its comparative advantage in the 
region. Greece is now following the EU foreign policy, and is putting forth claims 
that none of the Europeans dare to tell69.  
 
Simitis tried hard to give a new image to PASOK before the elections were held, and 
his decision “to clean up the governing Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (known as 
PASOK) and make it more ‘European’ was to a large extent successful.”70 Although, 
Simitis lost the elections and in 2004 March the Conservative Party led by Costas 
Karamanlis won general elections, ending a decade of PASOK government, he still 
will be remembered by most of the Greeks as a great leader who changed most of 
Greek foreign policy and altered the policy-making process in Greece. In addition, he 
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justified his foreign policy by utilizing the EU norms and values, for instance, “The 
European Union, he said, was an area of friendship, peace and cooperation in which 
one member-state could neither make territorial claims against another nor question 
the rules of international law. The EU’s “Agenda 2000”, he added, clearly stated that 
EU member states recognized the authority of the International Court of Justice. Mr. 
Simitis underlined that from the moment EU puts this forth as a condition, Turkey 
should accept the authority of the Court”71.  Moreover, he no doubt managed to steer 
Greece into the euro zone, through whether this move was for the good of the nation 
or not remains to be seen.  
 
Simitis’s willingness to be part of the EU can be traced in his anti-American attitude. 
Although Simitis gave permission for American military aircraft to fly over Greece 
on their way to bomb Iraq and he has given Americans access to a NATO military 
base on the Greek island Crete, yet always kept them at bay. He was more willing to 
side with the EU and be a part of the EU policies as much as possible. Euro Forces in 
Macedonia must have pleased Simitis greatly, when he announced on 16 January 
2003 that the Euro Forces had officially replaced NATO mission there73. 
 
In summary, in this period of Greece's participation in the Union that is the one we 
are currently experiencing, commenced in 1996 and has been characterized by even 
further support for the idea and process of European integration and intensifying 
integration in every department, in line with the federal model. It is also 
characterized by an effort towards greater economic and social convergence with the 
fulfillment of the “convergence criteria” set by the Maastricht Treaty and Greece's 
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participation as a full member in the single currency, namely euro, and the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) since January 1, 2002. The European Union Greek 
Presidency (first semester 2003) was the fourth in Greece's course as member of the 
European Union74. Greece, finally, learned the rules of the game and played 
according to the rules and norms of the EU. 
 
 Simitis adjusted Greece’s foreign policy and strategy in line with the EU rules and 
guidelines. In conclusion, in this period Simitis managed to “overcome its reputation 
as the EU’s unruly teenager”75. This negative image had caused Greece a lot of 
trouble and proven to be not so beneficial for the country’s reputation in the EU. 
However, “much has changed since Andreas Papandreou brought Pasok to power on 
a strongly populist and anti-Western platform”76. Especially after the death of 
Andreas Papandreou Simitis’ succession, Pasok really shock off the past and built a 
novel policy like trying to pull Greece closer to the EU and to build a constructive 
relationship and end the historical animosity with Turkey. Furthermore, change of 
attitudes came into the context with the desire to be a part of the EMU. Simitis 
committed to economic reforms that permitted Greece eventually into the EMU.  
 
Not only did Simitis change the course of politics in Greece but also the public 
opinion changed. Greek attitudes were compared from 1980 to 1990. In this 
comparison it was observed “with the exception of the 1988 Euro barometer poll, in 
all other years, Greek attitudes were above the EU average for the entire 
                                                 
74 http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/greece/history.html 
75 The Economist, Taking the chair, (2003) pp.21. 
76 Hope, Kerin, Greece Gains Momentum, Europe, (1997) pp. 12. 
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community”77. Thus, the anti-European or Western attitude came to an end. Greek 
public had indeed seen the benefits of being played an important part of the 
European Union and, of course, the subsidies disposed to Greece in changing the 
attitudes. Now the Greek public had no doubt that it needed to integrate further to 
harvest the benefits of being a EU member. Greek people also supported the EMU 
and believed in its benefits, according to the calculations done by Bundesbank, the 
distribution in proportion to EMI shareholders Greece stood in the group of Europe’s 
winners together with France, Italy, Britain, Spain, Sweden, Germany were grouped 
as the losers after EMU came into force78.  
 
 
2.3. Beginning of a New Era between Greece and the EU: Decision and the 
Aftermath 
 
In 2000 Greece formally applied to be part of the single money club. Greece was the 
only EU member who wished to join the single currency, yet was not accepted 
because it failed to meet the criteria set by the EU laid out in Maastrict in 1991. This 
disappointed the Greek government but this triggered the Greek will to integrate 
further to the EU. In the few years that followed Simitis modernized the centre left 
government and this in turn made it possible for Greece to catch up fast with the EU 
criteria. For instance, tax collection became far more efficient when Greece 
improved its Information Technology (IT) and computerized the system. In addition, 
bond trading was modernized and adjusted to the EU standards. Moreover, spending 
as a proportion of GDP was steady and consistent. As a result of all these 
                                                 
77 For more information see table in the appendix, George, A. Kourvetaris, Studies on Modern Greek 
Society, (1999) pp.. 319.  
78 For the central banks table see the table in the appendix, Economist, Profit Sharing, (1996), pp. 12. 
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improvements, not only did inflation fall sharply but also the public debt and budget 
deficit dropped to more or less EU levels79.  
Yet all these developments were not enough for Greece to be accepted into the single 
currency. Greece had to improve its telecom, energy, and shipping, and liberalize 
them. Fortunately, Greece did not have too much difficulty in liberalizing them 
because joining the euro was very popular between the business sector and the public 
opinion. There were great expectations about joining the EMU in Greece. According 
to the pollsters, nearly three quarters of the Greeks wanted it80. The Greek National 
Economy and Finance Minister Yiannos Papantoniou stated that, “budget for 
accession to Economic and Monetary Union, whose ratification will pave the way for 
the powerful Greece which we all dream about”.81 Thus, the statesmen as well as the 
public and business sector were willing to join in the single currency club. Greece 
was not only willing but also able to achieve its aim because there were positive 
signals from the Europe’s Central Bank and the European Parliament that they would 
approve Greece to be included to the euro in a few years82. The Greek government 
set itself a target of doing so in 2001, before the first euro coins and notes came into 
circulation83. Unfortunately, this target was delayed and Greece managed to join in 
2002, which was not bad at all and finally, in 2002 January Euro replaced drachma. 
This step was a significant indicator that Greece, after a rough and long integration 
process, had finally achieved its objective. 
 
                                                 
79 More Takers, Economist , (2000), pp. 13. 
80 Ibid. pp.13. 
81 EMU Accession,  Presidents & Prime Ministers, (1998), pp.21.  
82 More Takers,  Economist , (2000), pp. 13. 
83 The Euro: Making its Presence Known, Europe, (1998), pp. 13. 
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Simitis had a great deal of success in overcoming the opposition to the reforms 
necessary to be taken to reach the Maastrict criteria. Especially reforming the 
bureaucracy and trimming the overcrowded bureaucracy was not an easy task to 
accomplish. The economy was growing steadily; furthermore, it was fueled by both 
public and private investment. Greek companies invested vastly in the Balkans too. 
The end of the Cold War did indeed assist to boost the Greek economy. The window 
of opportunity was utilized well and Greece improved its competitiveness and 
position in the region84. The EU funding was utilized intelligently in this period. 
Greece had learned from its past mistakes. Thus, these funds were directed to major 
project. For instance, it was used to improve Greece’s transport infrastructure and 
help link the EU with the Balkans and Turkey85. Simitis government did indeed play 
a major part in improving the economy and adopting Greece into the Maastrict 
criteria set in 1991. In this sense, Simitis once again showed his talents in integrating 
Greece into the EU and in turn Europeanizing Greece. With the end of the Cold War 
there were new post-Cold War concerns and of the end of the Cold War the defined 
world structure came to an end. Thus, this undefined global structures that were in a 
state of flux and this in turn raised potential for serious conflicts in many areas of 
previously stable areas. 
 
 There was a need for conflict free transition into democracy and a market economy 
in post communist countries. Greece met this demand and Simitis understood that the 
his “nation’s optimal defense and security position for the foreseeable future began 
with a healthy and competitive economy functioning under conditions of free trade 
                                                 
84 Hope, Kerin, Greece Gains Momentum, Europe, (1997), pp. 12.  
85 Ibid. pp.12.  
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integrated in an environment of strong democratic institutions backed by well trained 
and well equipped armed forces sufficient to maintain the regional military balance” 
86. Joining the euro was one of Simitis’s ultimate aims and after a decade of sustained 
policy effort, Greece met this policy objective. Yet, in the rush to satisfy the criteria 
did Simits have second thoughts on how this integration would affect the Greek 
economy? The short answer to that will have to be probably because after Greece 
joined in the single currency it’s economy soared and in 2003 the inflation was on 
the rise again. It is exceeding an annual rate of 87 what the public does not hesitate to 
show its disappointment by protesting about the high inflation. In addition, the flow 
of EU funds slowed down as the European Commission imposes tighter accounting 
controls on them.  Now with enlarged EU the “juiciest subsidies” will flow to 
countries like Poland and Hungary rather than Greece Spain and Portugal88. The 
good old days have seemed to pass for Greece. It no longer has the full backing and 
support of the EU with its large amount of funds as in the past. It is now expected 
from Greece to stand on its own feet and the only way for Greece to come through 
this rough time is through further Europeanization. It is said, “Europeanization would 
be the solution to the Greek problem”89.  
 
Perhaps it was the economic uncertainty in Greece that resulted in the fall of 
Simitis’s government, after being in power since 1996. Costas Karamanlis succeeded 
him in his position after spending most of his career in opposition90. When he first 
came to office there were doubts about what kind of a foreign policy he would be 
                                                 
86 Greek foreign policy since 1974, Theodore A. Couloumbis & Sotiris Dalis (*) pp. 
87 Having it both ways, Economist, (2003), pp. 11. 
88 What’s ours is ours, Economist, (2001), pp. 9. 
89 George Andreou and Nikos Koutsiaras, Greece and Economic and Monetary Union, (2002) pp. 104 
90 Sprinting start? , Economist, (2004), pp. 5.  
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pursuing. Yet he did not divert very much from Simitis’s . For instance, in his first 
days in office he had to focus on the United Nations backed effort, namely the Annan 
Plan, to reunite Cyprus. Karamanlis seemed keen on resolving this issue91. However, 
he did not put real effort on persuading the Greek Cypriots to accept the plan. When 
the Greek Cypriots rejected it he simply stated that he hoped that this would not ruin 
the Turkish-Greek relations that were established for the past five years. Karamanlis 
stated “mutual relations had entered what he called a new orbit, reaffirming his 
support for Turkey’s bid to enter the EU”92.  
 
In this context, it is clear that Karamanlis is going to follow the set path and will not 
change the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey. All his statements up to know have 
been on the same line, all stressing that the relations have acquired a directness 
which is very important for Karamanlis. Tayip Erdoğan’s visit has demonstrated that 
the Cyprus issue would not affect Turkey’s relations with Greece although it was 
clear that his visit would not in any way bring progress on the Cyprus issue. “The 
fact that the vote did not affect relations between Athens and Ankara is significant” 
stated the BBC’s Athen’s correspondent Richard Galpin. He was right in not 
understanding the Turkish reaction to the outcome of the referendum in Cyprus in a 
sense because Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots had been blamed as the intransigent 
ones93. However, there was no reaction what ever to the whole event from Tayip 
Erdoğan’s government. On the contrary, he visited Greece in order to show the world 
                                                 
91 Unity? , Economist, (2004), pp. 6. 
92 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3694221.stm 
93 The loser takes all, New Statesman, (2004), pp. 8. 
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the Cyprus isues did not affect the Greek Turkish relations. Moreover, he seems to be 
keen to assist Turkey to join the EU club.94  
 
Karmanlis has declared that Greece is changing course while the elections were 
about to be held. He had accused the PASOK government of causing poverty, 
withering agriculture, decline in tourism, de-industrialization and dead ends for small 
and medium sized companies”95. When hearing these harsh and rough accusations to 
the old government it is not to think he would accuse them for joining the EMU too. 
However, he did not accuse them of the EMU but he added that PASOK was to be 
blamed for great losses of EU funds because there was not enough transparency. 
Furthermore, he announced that he would bring wages and pensions in line with the 
EU level. Thus, none of these declarations had any signal that Karamanlis would 
divert from the Europeanization policy set by Simitis’s government? They are all in 
the same direction as Simitis’s policies towards the EU and it can be further said that 
Greece will go on integrating into the EU, during the Karamanlis government as 
well.  
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CHAPTER III. STATE MODERNIZATION AND ADJUSTMENT: 
 THE INTEGRESSION PROCESS 
 
3.1. Macroeconomic effects of Greece’s accession to the EU 
 
Accession to the EEC had a number of macroeconomic effects, all of which need to 
be tackled. There were numerous basic effects; firstly, there were price effects from 
the introduction of VAT. Secondly, it led to a gradual freeing of labor movements 
and an operation of the Regional and Social Funds. Thirdly, there was an application 
of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which is price alignment for agricultural 
products. Fourthly, there was a reduction of government income out of import duties 
and taxes. Last but not least, the effects of budget financing the European Institutions 
and various financial transfers out of the EEC budget96.  
 
Greece accepted the acquis communautaire relative to fiscal matters by signing the 
Accession Treaty with EEC. Accordingly, to the government was expected to 
introduce the VAT97 regime in three years. In this context, the substitution of VAT 
for many of these taxes, moreover this actually operates as tariffs, contributed to the 
imports. In addition, VAT exemption of capital goods has been an incentive to 
                                                 
96 George, N. Yannopoulos, Greece and the EEC, ( ), pp.7-8.  
97 Value Added Tax (VAT) is a tax on the final consumption of certain goods and services in the 
home market but is collected at every stage of production and distribution, for more information see 
http://www.hmce.gov.uk/business/vat/vat.htm 
98 George, N. Yannopoulos, Greece and the EEC, ( ), pp.8. 
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exports. In turn, VAT exemption of capital goods has been an incentive for 
investments. However, the application of the VAT system is not inflation–neutral 
because the burden of taxes had been redistributed98.  
 
On the other hand, according to Article 45 of the Accession Treaty free labor 
migration is guaranteed starting from 1st of January 1988. Thus, the Greeks had to 
wait for seven years in order to attain full labor movement. Hence, the effects of 
these measures were marginal during the transition period. However, later, the 
immigration and its effects started to affect Greece after this gradual freeing of labor 
was attained. But, the impact did not last long and as the real wages in Greece grew 
faster than in other Community countries the stimulus to migration diminished 99.  
 
Operation of the Regional and Social Funds had a significant effect on the macro 
economy of Greece. As Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome100 was in force the 
maximum aid represented 20 per cent of the investment cost in the case of a post 
created or 40 per cent in the case of infrastructure projects, on the other hand, the 
operation of the Social Fund finances 50 per cent of the project costs so that an effort 
is required to prepare interesting and qualitative proposals to get these funds. Yet, the 
Greeks managed to utilize these funds in an effective way101. The Structural Map 
                                                 
 
 
99 Ibid. pp. 9. 
100 For more information see Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome that stipulates that the principle of 
incompatibility of state aids as far as this support influences trade between member countries or when 
competition is falsified through favoring specific enterprises or sectors. The principal exception to this 
rule concerns government aids for the economic development of regions where the standard of living 
is abnormally low or which are characterized by serious underemployment.  
101 George, N. Yannopoulos, Greece and the EEC, (1995), pp.10. 
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was 102. Another aspect that affected the Greek economy was the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP)103 of EEC. 
 
The macro economic outcome of CAP to the Greek economy have been threefold, 
firstly, the variation in the index of import prices had increased from +3.8 percent to 
+5 percent. Thus, there was a 1.2 percent increase in the import prices. In this 
context, the increase in import prices led to a negative affect on the Greek economy. 
Greece now had to pay more to import its agricultural products to the country. 
Secondly, the variation of the producer’s prices of total national production was +4.3 
percent. The producer’s prices to agricultural products also increased because of 
CAP implications. Lastly, the net variation of agricultural income was +6.5 
percent104.  
 
The obligations imposed by the Accession Treaty was numerous105and this affected 
the reduction of government income out of import duties and taxes, as well as the 
spread of the effects over a transition period of five years and the price effects of 
tariff reductions and alignments on imports. The tariff reductions after accession 
affected the import growth rate. In addition, the gradual abolition of quantitative 
import restrictions was difficult to find out. However, it was calculated that an 
                                                 
102 http://www.openheritage.com/public_downloads/OHReport_en.pdf 
103 The application of CAP, firstly, implied that prices of agricultural products will be aligned with 
reference to Community prices resulting in an increase of Greek producer prices and thus finally of 
consumer prices. Secondly, it also implied that Greece would adopt the Common income support 
measure. Thirdly, Greek levies on imported agricultural products produced in third countries will be 
transferred to the Common Agricultural Fund and that Greece will accept the common prices for 
agricultural imports from the EEC-9. Fourthly, the operation of the Orientation Fund to develop 
production structures and marketing was to be applied. Last but not least, there was the necessity to 
abolish national subsidies to Greek farmers.  
104 George, N. Yannopoulos, Greece and the EEC, ( ), pp.11. 
105 The obligations imposed by the Accession Treaty implied that the remaining duties on Community 
products are lifted in six years stages. Moreover, the Greek external tariff is aligned to the Common 
Market external tariff. Furthermore, it imposed that Greece adopts the agreements concluded by the 
Community with third countries. Another obligation was that Greece was imposed to gradually 
abolish its import controls.  
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increase by 5 percent of total elasticity of import was sufficient to produce the 
expected positive accession effects. “This confirms that the opportunity of obtaining 
benefits from integration in a period of economic crisis and persistent structural 
imbalances was not evident for Greece”106.  
 
What effect did the participation of the Greek government have in the financing of 
the European Institutions and various other financial transfers out of the EEC 
budget? Greece got enormous amount of funds, namely the Agricultural Fund, the 
Regional Fund, the Social Fund and many other forms of funds in the field of science 
research, energy, Common Market industrial and transport policies. These funds 
summed up to 33-40m ECU in the first year of accession107. 
 
The Structural Funds attempted to strengthen the weaker regions and let these 
regions “reap the benefit of the single market”.108 The increase of EU funds to 
Greece was not only transfer of subsidies into Greek economy but also was an 
assistance to integrate and develop the country, in other words, Community Support 
Framework was agreed to be given to less developed regions. In the period 1989-
1993 the structural funds amounted to 7.2 billion ECU, with Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes. The immediate affects of these funds to the Greek 
economy were enormous. 50 000 new jobs were created and 70% of the total 
investment programme in Greece was co-financed. Yet there was another CSF when 
at the Edinburgh Summit it was agreed that increase budget resources and finance 
another CSF. Greece received a total of 5.62 billion ECU during 1994–1999. In 
                                                 
106 Yannopoulos, Greece and the EEC, ( ), pp.12. 
107 Ibis. pp. 12.  
108Georgious, George A. The Dynamics of the Community Support Framework for Greece and its 
Contribution to Regional Convergence, European Planning Studies, (1999), pp. 9. See the Appendix 
for detailed information and figures.  
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addition, a Cohesion Fund complemented the Structural Funds for those countries 
like Greece, whose GDP per capita was less than 90% of the Community average. 
Greece received 2.31 billion ECU in the 1994-1999 periods.  
 
There were, also, many other automatic and own resources of the Community 
institutions109. The effects of budget financing of the European Institutions and 
various financial transfers out of the EEC budget following EEC regimes were as 
follows: for instance, if there was an affect on meat and maize imports. Greece was 
refund for loses it made because of these regimes. And Greece received an income 
from VAT. It received, net, 82m UA in the first transition year, and 150, 280, 350, 
467 and 500m UA, respectively in 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986, as a result of 
this mechanism. This assisted Greece a great deal to overcome the heavy burden and 
the difficulties the transition period had brought about for Greece by adopting itself 
to the new regimes of the EEC. As one can follow from the figures the refunds given 
increased through the years.  
 
All these contributions from EU was made to integrate the Greek economy to EU, in 
other words to satisfy conditions for Greece’s accession to Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). There was also the expectation of attaining a macroeconomic stability 
accompanied by economic and social infrastructure, training of the workforce, 
sustaining an effective operation of the public administration and an increase in 
attracting investments from private sector. In Maastricht in 1991, all the requirements 
                                                 
109 The automatic and own resources of the Community institutions consisted of the following 
elements; firstly, the duties on imports coming from third countries, secondly, the agricultural levies 
on imports out of third countries when the world market price is below the EEC threshold price with 
respect to imports. Thirdly, the specific taxes established by the EEC under a Common Policy, for 
instance the sugar levy. Last but not least, if the former three resources of revenues being insufficient 
to finance the activities of the institutions, those institutions can claim a part of the member countries’ 
tax income out of VAT. For more information see Ibid. pp.13. 
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were listed and in what conditions Greece could join in was also clearly understood 
from the treaty110.  
 
3.2. Contemporary changes in government policy 
 
In recent years the Greek economy has improved a great deal, although it has been a 
long and uneasy process. The long-term goal of the Greek government made it 
imperative that the government tackle some of the problems that long held back 
Greek economy. In May 2000, the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank both accepted and certified Greece as being ready to join the single currency, 
and in the coming months the EU’s Economic and Financial Council and the EU 
heads of state approved entry for Greece. This fact is testimony that the Greek 
economy has attained a high level of economic convergence with EU member states. 
For instance, inflation has fallen dramatically from levels of 20% at the beginning of 
1990s to estimably 2% by the end of the decade111. On the other hand, the real GDP 
growth outperformed the EU average since the 1993 recession. 
 
 If details need to be given, the GDP reached 3.5% in 1998 and an estimated 3.3% in 
1999112. Primarily high levels of investment affected the growth of the GDP with 
considerable support from the above-mentioned structural funds. In turn, real wages, 
household wealth as well as consumer wealth have risen. Moreover, exports 
improved because the trade grew among the country’s main trading partners; 
                                                 
110 The basic preconditions set by the Maastricht required Greece to reduce inflation rate, to at least 
5% although the EMU criterion is an inflation rate no more than 1.5%. Secondly, a decrease in the 
public sector deficit required being 3%. Lastly, it was also required that the public sector debt was 
required to be under 60% of the GDP. For more information see,  Schaefer, Guenther, Regions in the 
Policy Process of the EC- Reflections on the Innovation of the Maastricht Treaty, European Institute 
of Public Administration, (1993), pp.3.  
111 Economic Analysis Group, Short Term Growth Outlook, Dun& Bradstreet Limited, (2003), pp.14. 
112 For the yearly GDP Growth Contribution by Demand see Appendix.  
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however the trade deficit remained considerable. Yet, the unemployment rate was 
still very high in spite of a higher level of economic growth. Furthermore, the 
government debt was the highest among the EU members. It was far above the EU 
target set by the Maastricht treaty, it was 104% and the expected standard was under 
60% as stated above. However, the public sector deficit narrowed down to less than 
2% in 1999 from 14.2% in 1993. This was a positive development because the 
Maastricht guidelines were met. This improvement boosted the confidence of the 
market and resulted in lower interest rates. There was an improvement in almost all 
fields because these “set in motion a virtuous cycle”113, which in tact set the Greek 
economy and improved its chance to get admitted to the EMU.  In summary, the 
funds, indeed, prepared the Greek economy to the EMU even though it took some 
time and effort.  
 
3.3. Customs Union and its effects on the Greek Economy 
 
In the years prior to accession, Greece implemented a protectionist policy. In this 
sense, the major change that came about with accession was the change of this 
protectionist policy applied by Greece to other countries while trading with them. 
Moreover, this external protection, namely tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and state 
aid such as export subsidies was gradually removed. Furthermore, this change of 
policy harmed the Greek firms because they were ill prepared to this change, thus, 
their market shares quickly deteriorated114. 
 
                                                 
113 Economic Analysis Group, Short Term Growth Outlook, Dun& Bradstreet Limited, (2003), pp.15. 
 
114 Kazakos, O.J. and P.C. Ioakimidis, Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, (1994), pp 35. 
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Imports from the EU countries rose fast, especially for traditional consumer goods, 
intermediate goods as well as capital 115. Thus, the result was that there was a much 
higher increase in imports than the increase in exports. In addition, the domestic 
consumption of imports increased from 25.8 percent to 43.1 percent. This led to an 
alarming trade deficit from $7 billion in 1976-80 to $20 billion in 1991. The full 
accession to the EU did not prevent the negative effects of the customs union. Greece 
went through an acute balance of payments crisis in 1985 and 1990/91116. In this 
context, it is hard to talk about positive effects of the customs union on Greece, 
which had an uncompetitive market economy where trade firms could not compete 
with the EU countries.  
 
In conclusion, having these figures at hand it is hard to believe the customs union 
had any positive implications on the Greek economy, if anything, it lead to crisis in 
Greek economy. If the EU funds had not come to Greek assistance, Greece would 
have been in deep trouble. It was the full accession and, thereby the EU funds, that 
enabled the Greek economy to stand the balance of payment deficits it experienced 
during the integration years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
115 Giannitsis, T., Trade effects, the balance of payments and implications for the productive system, 
(1994), pp. 34.  
116 Onno J. Kuik and Frans H. Oosterhuis, Lessons from the southern enlargement of the EU for the 
environmental dimensions of eastern enlargement, in particular Poland, (2001), pp. 8. 
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3.4. Trade in manufacturing and agricultural products and the implications of 
accession 
 
The majority of exports to Greece come from the EU countries and the reason for 
this is no wonder the duty free status Greece has with these countries; on the other 
hand, close proximity to the market fosters the export to EU countries while 
exporters sustain lower transportation costs. On the other hand, for imports from 
outside the EU, the Common External Tariffs are applied. It is to be well noted that 
the level of duties differs for import commodities such as raw materials and 
commodities than other products such as textiles and agricultural goods. While 
imports of commodities and raw materials enter the country with little or no duties 
charged, other products such as textiles and agricultural goods are subject to higher 
and more complicated levels of protection. In addition, Greece sometimes bans 
imports that complete directly with domestically produced goods117.  
 
Agricultural products were influenced with accession, thereby the products that were 
not in competition with the EC, namely crops such as cotton and tobacco and citrus 
fruits, on the other hand, the products in competition with the EC products was at the 
disadvantage enormously 118. Thereby, economic growth slowed down in Greece 
after accession. Annual GDP growth (%) in Greece was 7.6 in 1961-70, 4.7 in 1971-
80, 1.4 in 1981-85, 1.9 in 1986-1990 and 1.1 in 1991-1995119.  
 
 
                                                 
117 Kazakos, O.J. and P.C. Ioakimidis, Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, (1994), pp 35. 
118 See Appendix for the Growth of Greek agricultural activity by enterprise prior and post accession. 
119 Onno J. Kuik and Frans H. Oosterhuis, Lessons from the southern enlargement of the EU for the 
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Greece did not diversify to more advanced industrial sector and agricultural 
production remained stagnant in the 1980s, in addition, both public and private 
investments were on the fall in real terms120. However, there was an increase in 
farmers’ incomes because the EU supported Greece with the CAP. Nevertheless, 
there was no real structural improvement and modernization. The assistance given to 
Greece was, in this sense, a delusion and it was not encouraged to develop Greek 
agricultural production in real terms.  
 
In general terms, in the 1990s Greek imports fell and it was at its lowest level in 
1994, however it rise a little through 1995 to 1997 and fell in 1999121. And about 
60% of Greece’s imports came from EU countries. On the other hand, Greek exports 
increased in 1999122. Moreover, the exports doubled since the early 1990s and the 
exports to the Balkans more than tripled in the 1990s after the end of the Cold Was. 
Greece has utilized the window of opportunity when the communist countries opened 
up their economies and tried to integrate themselves become a liberal economy. This 
was a good chance for Athens, and Greece optimized this opportunity. The rise in 
exports in the 1990s had nothing to do with Greece’s accession to the EU or the 
funds it received. It was just an opportunity that rises from the political 
circumstances in that part of the world. 
 
It has been found that 86% of the total trade creation was internal trade after 
accession, while 84% of the entire trade diversion was external trade diversion, these 
being results that accord with the theory of the customs union. Therefore, in terms of 
                                                 
120 Ibid. pp.12.  
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122 For the chart demonstrating the Greek exports as a percentage of GDP see Appendix.  
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an assessment of the dynamic effects, we can see that Greece's EU entry had mixed 
reactions in different sectors: in about two-thirds of the examined sectors we find that 
Greece's integration into the EU was desirable - in general, however, the integration 
indices are close to being the same, thus showing that the dynamic effects of the 
country's EU entry have been minimal123.  
 
Greek success in getting in the EMU, thereby increasing exports in the mid 1990s 
and especially in at the end of the 1990s was because of its geographic location. 
Greece knew that its welfare and security directly linked to the stability and 
economic prosperity in transition countries in the Balkans, the Black Sea as well as 
in Eastern Mediterranean 124. Greece was not late to understand the comparative 
advantage in this region because it is not only a EU member as well as its historical 
and cultural similarities it has with this region. In this way Greece not only played a 
brotherly role in the regions but also increased its exports. This, in turn, put Greece’s 
economy on the right track.  
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3.5. The rough road to the Euro: Implications of Greece’s joining the European 
Monetary System (EMU) 
 
Greece in the 1980s was characterized by growing macroeconomic imbalances and 
its economic growth was even slower compared to the preceding decade, that is, 
before Greece was a member of the EU. The slow growth rate had various reasons; 
firstly, inflation after the second oil crisis reached to its peak in 1985 and 1990 at 
over 20%. In addition, Greece’s government deficit increased throughout the decade. 
It reached its peak in 1990; it was more than 16% of the GDP. Moreover the balance 
of payments depreciated in 1985 and the deficit was of 4.5 percent of GDP, and later 
in 1989-90 it was 4.7 percent of the GDP. There were attempts to overcome the 
trouble, however, it never really worked out; the attempts were either abandoned or 
ineffective. In the Greek economy, if compared with the previous decade the growth 
rate was between 1973-79 2.6 percent and in 1979 to 1993 0.73 percent. There was 
not much will to invest due to low business sector profitability. Furthermore, the 
government debt was very high and the ratio rose from 50% in the early 1980s and 
was about 110% in 1994125, as stated above.  
 
Despite of the troubled Greek economy Greece was very willing to join the EMU. It 
was willing but was it able? At that time Greek economy was not able to satisfy the 
economic criteria it needed to fulfill in order to join in the single currency club. 
However, the will created a new dynamism since the mid 1990s that was in contrast 
to the experience in the 1980s and early 1990s. The growth rate increased to 3% 
followed with a strong growth in investment. The growth was supported by 
                                                 
125 Bank of Greece, Greece on the Threshold of EMU, (2000), pp.4. 
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privatization of state owned companies and improvements in Greece’s infrastructure. 
For instance, telecommunications, roads and shipping lines were modernized. The 
growth has been much higher than the EU average since 1996. In turn, the 
macroeconomic stability reflected upon the inflation, thus inflation fell to 
approximately 2%. A tight monetary policy and high interest rates has been another 
variable that contributed to the fall of inflation in Greece. A willing government has 
proven to be successful in curbing the inflation rate. In addition, the budget deficit 
fell to 1.6% of GDP by mid-1999126.  
 
It is amazing how Greece shifted the negative attitude into a positive one. In 1998 it 
seemed Greece had no change of joining the single currency. In New York Times it 
was discussed why Greece was excluded from the list of 11 countries adopting the 
euro and joining Euro was seen as a dim chance for Greece at the time 127. Mr. 
Papantoniou, the finance minister of Greece in 1998 managed to improve the budget 
deficit, long-term interest rates and public debt and brought them down to acceptable 
levels128. This was a success that worried other politicians, namely Costas Simitis, 
because Papantoniou was believed to have a chance to be the front-runner to succeed 
Simitis as a result of his success in macroeconomic variables. 
 
Despite Papantoniou’s success Greek public especially Greek youngsters as well as 
business people were supporting Simitis because they wished to enter to the 
‘Euroland’. Greece all through his governance in Greece has shown large 
                                                 
126 http://www.bankofgreece.gr/en/publications/pdf/cover.pdf 
127 Bohlen, Celestine, New York Times, (1998), pp. 8. 
128 Euro-Worries, Economist, (1998), pp.6. 
129 Hope, Kerin, Greece’s Goal, Europe, (1998), pp. 5. 
130 Euroland, Ahoy!, Economist, (1999), pp. 9. 
131 Reed, Stanley, Outside, Looking in, Business Week, (1999), pp. 3.  
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determination to bring Greece into the euro zone129. In 1998 the Greek economy was 
on the right track, and it had reached almost all economic targets set by the 
Maastricht treaty. The hopes rose in Greece when the economy got better and the 
expectation raised that Greece would be accepted in to the euro at the start of 
2001130. 
 
The motivation for the Greeks to join the EMU was triggered because they believed 
the club would boost the investment131. The rapid progress came about because of 
the willingness to join in. This progress gave signals that Greece would be included 
in the founder group of euro members in January 2001132. These signals gave Greece 
a motivation to take a big step towards its goal of joining the euro, thus, in January 
2000 Greek government decided to revalue the drachma that fluctuated in 15% bands 
around a central rate against the euro133. In March 2000 there were perceptions in the 
international media that Greece would indeed meet the criteria set by the Maastricht 
Treaty. On March 9 Greece applied for its membership to begin in January the 1st in 
year 2001. At that time Greece’s budget deficit fell to 1.7 percent of GDP and this 
was well below the Maastricht limit of 3 percent134. On January the 1st 2001 Greece 
indeed became the euro’s 12th member, and drachma that was Europe’s oldest 
currency was shaded away135. Thereby, Athens was in the Euroland to realize 
Greeks’ dreams and felt more integrated to the EU by being part of the EMU and in 
turn felt they would be able to close the wealth gap between Greece and EU136.  
 
                                                 
 
 
 
132 Hope Kerin, Greece’s Next Commissioner, Europe, (1999), pp. 10. 
133 Ever Closer to the Euro Club, Economist, (2000), pp. 7. 
134 Leonard, Dick, Greece Ready to Join Euro Club, Europe, (2000), pp.9.  
135 The Terrible Twos Begin, Economist, (2001), pp. 4.  
136 Athens in Euroland, World Link, (2002), pp. 3. 
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All these achievements in the Greek economy were accomplished because the Greek 
government did not want to be lagged behind the European monetary union. They 
gave too much importance to the monetary union and expected this would end the 
Greek economy’s sluggishness and bring in stability to the economy. For the first 
time Greece utilized the European Structural Funds well. Moreover, it managed to 
get the EU commitment in 1999 to provide further funds for the period 2000-2006 so 
that Greece could sustain inflation rates and growth rates at a desirable level. 
Furthermore, the EU made an EMU protocol with Greece so that Greece adopted the 
Euro.  
 
“The key issue for the euro and its success was, by contrast, the demonstration of 
personal competence with it by Greeks, the ability and even to know it intimately, in 
all its features”137. The euro succeeded in passing the test of European-ness, in a 
country that resisted being European in the beginning of accession and preferred to 
keep its Hellenistic characteristics. It bypassed the state apparatus and joining the 
EMU showed Greek willingness to identify with the ‘European identity’. It also 
demonstrated the ability of the Greeks; they had been able to live up to the standards 
of the Europeans. In this respect, the integration is a success that was not expected by 
any EU member at the beginning. Everybody had thought Greece had dim changes to 
enter the EMU but Greece proved everybody to be wrong.  
 
Nevertheless, did EMU really change the Greek economy to the better as it was 
expected? There was a price the Greeks needed to pay and had not calculated before 
entering the EMU. The Greek consumers are totally irritated with the rising prices 
                                                 
137 Malaby, Thomas M., Making Change in the New Europe: Euro Competence in Greece, 
Anthropological Quarterly, (2002), pp.17. 
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that accumulated with the integration to the single currency. The price of an average 
basket of goods has risen by 10%. The studies have demonstrated that the high-
visibility goods prices such as food has increased dramatically to the extent that the 
Greeks started to demonstrate on the streets to protest the rises in prices. On the other 
hand, big items like cars and houses do not seem to be affected as much.138 Greek 
Prime minister was under attack and he could not survive for long, even though he 
was the one that pulled Greece into the euro-zone. Greece was still EU’s poorest 
country and its economy was still not standing on its feet. Greece continued to be 
dependent on the EU funds allocated till 2006.  
 
Costas Simitis announced a welfare package costing euro 2.3 billion to appeal to 
pensioners, farmers and women139, nevertheless, non of this sort of initiatives was to 
save Simitis from losing his power. Neither the EMU nor has his European leaning 
could save him from being succeeded by Karamanlis’s government. The euro could 
not save Simitis and it is maybe understandable that the Greeks declined to vote him 
in votes again when the costs of small items has risen even faster since the start of 
this year because of rounding up of euro prices140. Boycotts were maybe a signal to 
the coming thunder but Simitis’s hands were tied up and nothing could not be turned 
around the Greek economy is on a road with no return.  
 
Nonetheless, Greece and Economic Monetary Union are considered to be an 
instrument of Europeanization141that will be dealt in detail below. When the Greeks 
managed to get in the euro club they then proved to have Europeanized as much as 
                                                 
138 Greteman, Blaine, It’s the price you have to pay, Time Europe, (2002), pp.3. 
139 Just in time?, Economist, (2003), pp. 9. 
140 A great lunch forward, Economist, (2002), pp. 8.  
141 George Andreou & Nikos Koutsiaras, Greece and Economic and Monetary Union, (1997), pp. 86.  
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expected from Greece. This long period of adaptation needs to be analyzed in great 
detail in order to have an idea about the process of Greek Europeanization. 
Moreover, it is significant to grasp what this concept is really about and whether or 
not this concept can be applicable to the real world or is it just a concept that hangs 
up on the air and has no real application in the realistic paradigm.  
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CHAPTER IV. CHANGING GREECE IN A CHANGING EUROPE 
 
4.1. The nature of the Europeanization process: Contradictions between policies 
and performance 
 
Another question addressed in this dissertation relates to the process of Greece’s 
Europeanization as a result of its EU membership. While addressing this question it 
is necessary to bear in mind the distinction between the policy and performance. 
Forming a state policy does not always mean that it will be successfully performed. 
Europeanization was desired by many member states such as Germany and France, 
however, it cannot be said that the desire was achieved or even achievable since 
Europe has neither single language nor a single culture to form a European notion 
among the European citizens. In this sense, there are no necessary aspect that will 
satisfy the conditions to form an Europeanization process, thus the whole process 
seem to be no further than a dream. Even if it is managed to form a basis, it will be 
only an artificial one that will not have sound grounds that will hold it together. 
When the common interests disappear then, immediately, the whole process will 
come to an end due to weakness in its structure.   
 
Building a nation also requires similar aspects that are necessary for forming an 
Europeanization notion among its citizens. Both of them need to have a common 
culture, common language, and a common historical background or shared past. Yet 
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the EU has none of these aspects to form a common Europeanization notion.  
Common interest, namely economic interests, is not enough form an Europeanization 
notion because when member states do not share the same interests then it will bound 
to be destroyed as suggested above.  
 
 
4.2. The stages in the Europeanization process: The threefold process 
 
The Greek Europeanization will be assessed in a three-fold process, namely the 
governmental adaptation, political adaptation and strategic adaptation. With 
governmental adaptation, what are referred to are the changes in Greece’s 
administrative mechanism and infrastructure. On the other hand, with political 
adaptation the existence of a political will to adjust domestic politics to the EU 
policy criteria is referred to. With strategic adaptation what is meant be is the 
development of strategies for use in EU negotiations to get the upper hand.  
 
The governmental changes were not only permanent but also ad hoc. Setting up of 
departments in various ministries to deal with the everyday running of European 
affairs was included as the permanent changes. On the other hand, when participation 
in the EC created other administrative requirements then ad hoc administrative 
changes were undertaken. The cases demonstrated themselves that the Greek 
administration only reached a sufficient level during the 1996-7 in applying the Inter 
Governmental Conference (IGC). In addition, during 1981 and 1985 most of the 
ministries were added to the already existing departments. Nevertheless, the efforts 
were not enough because when the IGC started, Greece did not prepare for the needs 
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of the novel institutional mechanism and establish a well-coordinated ad hoc 
institution. Thus, it could not participate effectively in the new structural change the 
IGC brought to the system. This, in turn, hindered the bargaining power and 
negotiation performance of the country. In the 1990s not much of this problem was 
solved and the IGC’s requirements were not sufficient either. In 1996 Greece was 
very effective in setting the necessary institutional mechanism. This change 
increased Greece’s bargaining power since it gave the negotiators enough feedback 
so that they could bargain on the given date during the discussions, in turn, this 
increased the countries bargaining leverage. 
 
Political adaptation was another aspect of the Europeanization process of Greece in 
the EU. The government support for integration to the EU was very low when 
Greece entered the EEC. Greece was not sure it wanted to become a European 
country and give up the Hellenistic origins they belonged to. It was a gradual and 
difficult process for Greece to adapt to the idea of being Europeanized. The 
governmental support for incorporating EU politics into the Greek political system 
was slow. However, it strengthened between 1985 and 1997. In the 1985 the 
government realized that things were to change due to domestic political pressure 
and the Greek negotiators decided to play a more active role and take a more co-
operative line in the discussions of the IGC 142.  
 
Nonetheless this change of attitude was not really a U-turn and not much was 
changed as was argued by some scholars. The changes came about much more latter 
in Greece but there were some improvements that showed signs of political 
                                                 
142 For more details on the Greek position on the EP, see the relevant pages in Chapter 3. 
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adaptation. For instance, although the Greek government supported the role of EP in 
the allocation of the EC budget, they did not back the other issues and they retrained 
an idiosyncratic position when it came to the establishment of the internal market and 
the strengthening of EPC co-operation due to internal political constraints. 
Furthermore, “Greeks retained their reservations on relinquishing the veto on EPC 
issues”. This was probably due to their security concerns and bilateral relations the 
Greeks had, for instance with Turkey at that time.  
 
The Greek government’s support for EC strengthened and showed real signals of a 
will to Europeanize in the early 1990s. Before then all the efforts were either too 
little or not sincere. This was more due to the change of government and the efforts 
of the New Democracy Conservative party. This party had negotiated Greece’s 
accession to the EEC and since then it never changed its pro-European attitude. On 
the other hand, the change of attitude to EU was due to the generous EC financial 
contributions to Greece. Greece had tasted the easy money coming from the 
European club and could no longer live without it. As was stated above in chapter 3 
Greece received a considerable amount of structural aid in the 1980s.  
 
This aid came both from the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes IMP s and the 
1988 First Delors Package. (Generous contributions were provided for instance 
through IMP s, that Greece was beneficiary of and the 1988 First Delors Package 
giving Greece considerable amount of structural aid.) This, in turn, increased 
dependence of Greece on the EU aid and this was the main reason why the Greek 
government began to support the Europeanization143. However, the real support for 
                                                 
143 For further details see Chapter 4 pp.310. 
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Europeanization came about after Simitis gained power in Greece. Simitis increased 
the Europeanization process because there was strong will to join the euro-zone. 
Thus, the change of policy came into effect with the desire to join the European 
Monetary Union (EMU). In addition, the will to harness Greece’s security interests 
into the CFSP was another factor that resulted in a change of policy.  
 
The strategic adaptation was the third aspect that needs to be studied while analyzing 
the Europeanization of Greece. With strategic adaptation the development of strategy 
for use in EU negotiations is referred to. It is structuring of a list of attainable and 
realistic goals and the ability to utilize all the means to achieve these goals. “With 
regard to the means to achieve national goals in IGCs, coalition building, concession 
making and side payments have all been identified as important for increasing the 
bargaining leverage of the EU member states during these negotiations”144.  
 
As in other two aspects of adaptation the Greek government was not prepared to plan 
strategically to the IGC and pursued a passive ‘wait’ and ‘see’ attitude. For sure if 
you are not ready to take part fully in politically and administratively in the IGCs 
then it is very likely that you have no strategic plan either. However, in the 1990-1 
when the political situation was ripe to Europeanize the strategic planning was not 
yet in effect. Nonetheless, there were some changes involved but they were not 
enough. For instance, there were changes in strengthening of bilateral 
communications between Greece and its counterparts and there were changes seen in 
Greece’s bargaining power that was realized to have increased noticeably in the 
IGCs145.  
                                                 
144 Wallace (1990) op. cit. 
145 (tez p.312) 
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Yet, the strategic planning reached its peak during the 1996-7; strategic bargaining 
was now radically changed. The Greek government now prepared a list of pragmatic 
goals ahead of the IGCs that was not done before during past years. The use of this 
planning was not realized and taken seriously earlier. However, Greeks did not 
hesitate to understand its benefits for too long. In the 1990s the economic indicators, 
for instance-increased deficit, high inflation, and large and unproductive public 
sector were not in good shape. The political structure was more pro favoritism and 
not much success was achieved146. Once again, it was the Simitis government that 
modernized the Greek economy and changed most of the economic variables that 
were in bad shape in 1996. Simitis realized that being a European was far more 
beneficial then sticking to the old Hellenistic roots that did not bring about much 
credit to Greece.  
 
 
4.3. The Europeanization of Greece: Interest Politics and the Crises of 
Integration 
 
There is a widespread assumption that domestic arrangements and institutionalized 
practices limit the impact of Europeanization. Thus, a linkage is formulated between 
domestic politics and European developments. Therefore, the policy goals of the 
governments had direct impact on the Europeanization process. In this context, there 
are two aspects that play a dominant role in the process of Europeanization, namely 
the type of policy concerned and the mediating role existing in domestic 
                                                 
146 see ch. 3.  
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arrangements. Nevertheless, there are indeed other variables that affect the content of 
the goals of business strategy and regulate the national policies of the governments. 
In addition, policy instruments are affected by historical and contextual factors. 
Moreover, policy styles and policy patterns might be also less flexible. A strong and 
practical motive is needed to change these fixed patterns in politics. Thereby, “the 
European policy stimuli in the 1980s and 1990s focus attention on the implications of 
national institutional arrangements and interest politics for Europeanization”147.  
 
In the case of Greece, for instance, up till Kostas Simitis was elected to replace 
Andreas Papandreou, Greek political patters remained the same as before accession. 
After the change of prime minister in Greece the whole domestic political process 
and goals seem to have changed. Simitis, for example, has made a distinguished 
stabilization programme and this improved the Greek governments relations with the 
businessmen in Greece incredibly. Moreover, he pursued a road toward European 
convergence which no party had done up to then. Thus, strong leadership skills may 
also change the routine course of the government policies. During Andreas 
Papandreou rule, a form of defensive nationalism emerged as a threat to 
Europeanization148. Issues concerning Turkish-Greek rivalry over Cyprus, the 
Aegean and the Balkans affected the Europeanization process immensely. The Greek 
diplomatic entanglement with FYROM and Albania were examples when Greece 
had enormous problems with the EU over settling them. “The use of foreign issues in 
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domestic party competition intensifies the dilemmas for policy”149. Why and how it 
affected the Europeanization process will be dealt with in detail in the fifth chapter.  
 
4.4. Where are these debates of Europeanization likely to lead to? A Strongly 
Unified Europe or a Fragile Europe likely to break up 
 
There are debates about the notion of Europeanization and whether it is likely that 
this process will lead to a unified Europe or it will create a fragile one that will be 
shaky and on the way to break up. It is assumed that Europeanization is not a unique 
process and a sui generis phenomenon. Thus, it is hard to judge whether it would 
function or not in the future because there is no example or case to be studied. 
Therefore, it is better not to come to clear-cut conclusions about whether it will succeed 
or not.  
 
What, how and why this phenomenon come about in the first place needs to be 
discussed in the first place. First, Europeanization is taking place as the European Union 
expands its boundaries through enlargement. Second, Europeanization evolved as the 
development of institutions of governance at the European level. Third, 
Europeanization is the development of central penetration of national and sub-national 
systems of governance. In other words, Europeanization implies adapting national and 
sub-national systems of governance to a European political center and European-wide 
norms. Fourth, Europeanization can be defined as exporting forms of political 
organization and governance that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the 
                                                 
149 Ibid, pp. 254 
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European territory. In this context Europe tries to form a novel form of political 
organization and governance that are unique150.  
 
The Europeanization can be related to the dependency theory where the member 
states that wished to form a union needed to form a European culture in order to 
create a federal structure. Building a federal state was the objective of the EU and to 
fulfill this need to form European norms and values. The Europeanization process 
came out of the need of forming a European identity and utilizing different models in 
order to construct a ‘European model’ satisfied this demand. This model can be 
criticized to be artificial, thus it can be concluded that it is quite a vulnerable 
phenomenon that can easily be destroyed when the interests of the states vanish. The 
dependency is what keeps the Europeanization dynamic and evolving when there is 
no dependency among states. It is doubted that this phenomenon will in turn come to 
an end. Nevertheless, Europeanization may encourage interest convergence in 
specific areas, for instance, in the alignment of EU law and EU constitution. The new 
EU constitution was signed by 15 member states leaders in 18 June 2004151. 
 
 
Countries like Greece are willing to support the Europeanization process because 
they see a benefit in forming a strong EU that can stand up as a strong actor in 
control of world affairs. If the EU is strong enough then Greece will also benefit 
from the strength of the union as a member state of the union. In this sense it will 
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level governance.’ Journal of European Public Policy 6:2, pp. 329-348. 
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back the enlargement and deepening process in the EU and follow the convergence 
criterion and Europeanize its political and legal institutions as long as it has a stake in 
the EU: Other countries like Poland and newly accepted countries are likely to follow 
suit. When the interests disappear there will be no more meaning for the EU 
members in following the Europeanization process and then there may be problems 
for the Union to keep its unity. For instance, the structural funds are one of the 
benefits the EU offer to the member states that lag behind the others. If the funds are 
cut or are no longer available for the poorer ones these countries may in turn reject to 
follow the European norms and values.  
 
When the interests are gone then EU will be a fragile Union likely to break up, on the 
other hand if the EU’s economy does not undergo any economic depression then we 
can expect a strong unified Europe. Thus, it all depends on the economic strength of 
the EU and its willingness to give more funds to the member states. The only way to 
Europeanize Europe is through defining more interests for the member states to 
follow the norms and values of the EU. In fact the EU has been funded from such a 
mentality in the first place. Germany and France who had an interest in building such 
a community forgot their deeply rooted animosity in order to attain the interests the 
Coal and Steel Community would supply them. Nothing has been changed in the 
mentality after such a long period of time. Countries give up part of their sovereignty 
in order to utilize the interests the EU offers them. There is still no common culture, 
common language nor a shared historical past to build up the European federal state 
and evolve the Europeanization process.  
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CHAPTER V. GREECE INSIDE EU AND ITS IMPACT TO GREEK 
FOREIGN POLICY AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS  
 
5.1. Redefinition of territorial political relations: change in external foreign 
policy 
 
In spite of its status as the heir of ancient Greece, ever since the Hellenic Republic 
gained its independence and especially during the PASOK government it pursued a 
different foreign policy than the EU countries. This policy sometimes created 
conflict and tension between the EU and Greece. Especially during the Macedonian 
independence process was when the conflicts were at its peak. Jacques Delor, EU’s 
leading commissioner at that time, was quite harsh on his announcement it made to 
the public concerning the Greek attitude. Economist wrote that Delor ‘would be glad 
to see Greece leave the EU’; however there was no such exit clause in the EU 
Constitution at that time and the members could not leave whenever they wished to 
do so.  
 
Yet now with the new EU Constitution signed by the entire EU member states’ 
leaders in 18 June 2004, countries that have joined the EU can be suspended by a 
qualitative majority with the suspension clause and can leave the EU as stipulated by 
the exit clause152.    
                                                 
152 http://www.eubusiness.com/afp/040620013618.q5ssnfdy 
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The Greek ‘foreign policy influence is concentrated on the Balkans and the Aegean’ 
due to its geographical location and limited size153.  
 
Therefore, the focus of this thesis on Greek foreign policy will be primarily based on 
the Balkans and the Aegean. The thesis will be covering Greece’s relations with EU, 
Balkan countries, Turkey and Cyprus. Since the Simitis government came to power, 
Greece is not hesitating to play an active part in the debate on the future of Europe 
and is in favour of a more federal Europe with strengthened institutions. It no longer 
considers itself as a superior Hellenic civilization; rather, it has internalized the idea 
that it is part of Europe and the European civilization. This change of attitude has in 
turn has an effect on its foreign policy objectives. Greek foreign policy has changed 
over time because it felt the immediate need to adapt to the changing world 
conditions. The Greek foreign policy after the Cold War changed in the Balkans. The 
Greek government under Simitis’s leadership realized that ‘the road to the EU runs 
through the adoption of principles and values shared by the European family and 
constitute the very foundations of the EU: democracy, the rule of law, respect for 
human and minority rights, solidarity and market economy, respect for international 
law, inviolability of international borders, peaceful resolution of conflicts and 
regional cooperation’154.  
                                                                                                                                          
SUSPENSION CLAUSE: If one member state seriously flouts the bedrock EU values, the rest could 
decide by a qualified majority to suspend it.  
EXIT CLAUSE: The constitution sets out for the first time in EU law that a member state can leave 
the bloc if it so chooses. For further information on the new EU constitution see 
http://europa.eu.int/futurum/eu_constitution_en.htm 
 
153http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laender_ausgabe_html?type_id
=11&land_id=52 
154http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/balkans/general_principles.ht
ml 
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Greece follows a more pragmatic foreign policy now that it has come to the 
conclusion that it can no longer confront the changing conditions and realities of the 
world and the region. Greece has learned to speak the European diplomatic language, 
emphasizing the values and norms of the EU.  In addition, Greece's main priority in 
terms of EU enlargement was to secure membership for Cyprus as soon as possible, 
and it indeed managed to attain its objective. Furthermore, Greece backed the 
accession of other nine countries into the EU. 
 
‘As a member of NATO and the EU, Greece considers itself to have greater 
influence than the other Balkan countries and endeavors to use this privileged 
position to help these countries move closer to the EU and the Atlantic Alliance’155. 
This change of mindset and the new world conditions had an immediate effect on its 
foreign policy and the measures shaken to restore its relations with the Balkan 
countries. For instance, the Greek government had reiterated their commitment to the 
implementation of the Agreements signed in the aftermath of recent conflicts in the 
area. The Greek government had realized that ‘Balkans is a key priority for the EU’, 
thus it is high on its agenda. For instance, the recent launching of the EU Police 
Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and of operation ‘Concordia’ in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia clearly reflects the EU's commitment to the region. 
In particular, regarding Kosovo, we underlined our support for the UNSC Resolution 
1244/99 and for the ‘standards before status’ policy.  
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Especially after the Thessaloniki Summit in June 21 2003 this was confirmed 
because during the Summit, the European Union presented the ‘Thessaloniki 
Agenda: moving towards European Integration’ - endorsed by the European Council 
on June 20th - a set of new important measures, which strengthens its policy towards 
the region.  In this respect, the Greek government did not hesitate to follow the 
course of EU’s policies so that it would not lag behind the developments and could 
even make profits out of the window of opportunity for Greece to become a leading 
country in the Balkans. Therefore, Greece not only took a new stand in its foreign 
policy but also improved its economic relations with these countries and made great 
profits out of trade relations with the, as the only Balkan country in the EU at that 
time. Although this year in May 2004 many others have been accepted to join the 
club, Greece has nevertheless utilized to lead the Balkan countries and de Balkanize 
the Balkans during this process. The ceremonial signing of the accession treaties with 
the ten acceding countries in the ancient Agora in Athens on 16 April 2003 marked 
the completion of a key step towards this prime goal of the country's European 
policy. Moreover, Greece also wants Bulgaria and Romania to join so as to help 
bring greater stability to its neighbors in the Balkans. On the other hand, Greece 
announces that it ‘supports Turkey's accession to the EU, because it hopes thereby to 
resolve bilateral problems and the Cyprus issue’156. 
 
It is well known that Greece’s relations with Turkey have in the past repeatedly been 
rather tense. There are three main issues at stake, firstly, rights in the Aegean, 
secondly, the Cyprus problem and last but not least, to a lesser extent, the treatment 
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of the Muslim minority in Thrace. As stated above Greece has learned its lesson well 
and it no longer pursues an aggressive foreign policy as followed by the Andreas 
Papandreou’s government. In contrast, it utilizes the diplomatic language while 
trying to formulate and apply its foreign policy goals. Thus, Greece constantly 
repeats over and over again that  ‘Greece's foreign policy is based on a set of 
principles regarding respect for human rights, stability and border inviolability, 
peaceful settlement of bilateral disputes within the framework of International Law - 
including the possibility of recourse to the Hague Tribunal.  This policy aims at 
defining, through substantial bold initiatives, a framework of rules and principles of 
democracy and justice that will apply in our wider region. 
 
Foreign minister Georgios Papandreou made the normalization of relations with 
Turkey a top priority of Greek foreign policy only months after he assumed office in 
1999, which coincided with the destructive the earthquakes in Istanbul on 17 August 
1999 and in Athens on 7 September 1999. In this context, the slow but consistent 
‘rapprochement’ between the two countries has been helped along by the mutual 
assistance. The talks launched by the two foreign ministers, namely İsmail Cem and 
Georgios Papandreou, have since led to the conclusion of several bilateral Greek-
Turkish agreements that covered small and insignificant issues. The difficult issues 
have not yet been resolved but with this pubic show Greece created a positive image 
in Europe. 
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 This had no real effects on the countries’ bilateral relations nevertheless it has 
created an illusion that the bilateral relations between the two countries have been 
considerably improved. In sum, the Greek approach targeted at bringing into the 
framework of Euro-Turkish relations problems like the Cyprus Question, regarding 
the island's accession as well as the political problem that is now achieved with 
Southern Cyprus’s accession into the EU, in addition, issues regarding Greek-
Turkish relations, as well as the 12-mile problem in the Aegean Sea. Utilizing the 
European diplomatic language Greece has been quite successful in its new foreign 
policy towards Turkey. 
 
For instance, the above stated claim can be proved by the declaration made by the 
Greek foreign ministry as follows ‘the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of 
a new era, in which respect and cooperation between nations, commitment to human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law are recognized as being of fundamental 
importance. Within this new environment, the Cyprus issue is not only a glaring 
anachronism, but also continues to be a factor of potential instability in the South-
eastern Mediterranean. Hence, apart from moral obligation, the international 
community has an additional reason to contribute to efforts towards a just and viable 
solution’157. 
 
In this context illustrates the change of language of Greek government it is now 
utilizing the values and norms that are supported by the EU in reaching their aims. 
The sincerity of Greek declarations has been tested in the near past when the Annan 
                                                 
157 http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/cyprus/ 
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Plan rejected in the referendum that took place in Southern Cyprus. Greece had 
announced that they wanted the integrated whole of Cyprus to become a full member 
of EU, however, it showed that neither the Greek Cypriots nor the Greek government 
was actually willing to do so.  
 
5.2.The E.U- Greece-Turkey Triangle: The consequences of being a EU member 
 
The relations between Greece and Turkey altered with the new understanding in 
Greek foreign affairs. The old mindset was renewed by the Simitis government and 
especially with the novel approach of Foreign Minister George Papandreou. This was 
based ‘on the realization that a Europeanizing Turkey was in Greece's own national 
interest—has not only helped to improve Turkey's relationship with the EU, but it 
has already begun to bring about improvements in Greece-Turkey relations that 
would have seemed impossible only a few years ago’158. 
 
For instance, the European Union's December 1999 decision to accord Turkey the 
status of official ‘candidate’ was a historic turning point that will have long-term 
advantages for the EU, especially for Greece. In this manner EU and Greece could 
reinforces Turkey's European orientation, firstly it provided a strong incentive for 
Ankara to pursue its ongoing economic, political, and human rights reform based on 
the European guidelines, secondly bolstered Greece-Turkey relations, last but not 
least eliminated the deep resentment that Turkish government and many Turkish 
citizens felt toward the EU following the December 1997 Luxembourg summit's 
rejection of Turkey's candidacy.  
                                                 
158 http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/gordon/20000231.htm 
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This decision has altered the whole course of events, it not only altered the relations 
and Turkey became too vulnerable to refuse any of the EU criteria and ‘openly 
discussed the possibility of allowing Kurdish-language broadcasts and education, a 
longstanding European demand; postponed implementation of the death sentence of 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Öcalan, PKK terrorist organization 
leader in order to allow an appeal to be considered by the European Court of Human 
Rights; talked about abolishing the death penalty altogether; encouraged the 
continuation of the first Cyprus talks to be held for more than two years; made real 
efforts to improve their human rights record; and moved forward with the far-
reaching economic reform program’159.  
 
 
Turkey’s willingness to join the EU indeed gave both the EU and the Greek 
government a bargaining power. Greek government was not late to utilize this power 
in order to attain its objectives over Cyprus. The Simitis government made a new 
plan for the Greek Cypriots and this was to persuade the EU that if EU were in the 
equation of the problem the Cyprus problem would solve. Thus, now it was without 
doubt that Turkey’s relations with the European Union to a great extent depend on 
her attitude towards the Cyprus dispute. For example, Greece utilized EU’s 
bargaining power to persuade Turkey to take a new course in handling the matters in 
Cyprus and being more open to new solutions in the island. In fact the new plan of 
the Simitis government was to protect and secure Cyprus under the protection and 
security of the EU, by an accession plan of Cyprus into the EU.  ‘Greece supports 
                                                 
159 http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/gordon/20000231.htm 
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Turkey's accession to the EU, because it hopes thereby to resolve bilateral problems 
and the Cyprus issue’160. 
 
 
Yet why did EU agree on perusing such a role in Cyprus and did not pay enough 
attention to Turkey’s legitimate legal claims over the island and proceeded with the 
accession process. This would contribute both to the regional security and stability 
and in turn it would improve ‘EU’s newly evolving common foreign and security 
policy identity’161. Now it could improve its image as a novel international actor in 
world affairs. It was only after the Cold World War EU could start playing an active 
role in the evolution of the Cyprus problem because during the Cold War EU was 
under the influence of the US and United Kingdome. It could not function as an 
effective third party neither in the island nor elsewhere in the world.  
 
Greece was quite effective in persuading the EU and the world that she wanted to 
resolve the conflict in the island Greece. The Greek government repeatedly said 
throughout 2003 that ‘it believed that Cyprus problem should be solved on the basis 
of Annan Plan in a way complying with EU acquisitions and U.N. resolutions 
through negotiations which will be held under the auspices of the U.N. and gave 
signal that it would not accept an approach except it’. In addition, it did not hesitate 
to threaten Turkey by announcing in a diplomatic way that ‘if Cyprus issue was not 
                                                 
160 http://www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/print_html?type_id=11&land_id=52 
161 For more information see Tarık Oğuzlu, The EU-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle: The Prospects of 
Reconciliation, The Europeanization of Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, Edited by Ali 
Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşan, Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, 2004.   
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solved, it would not accept Turkey's starting membership negotiations with the EU at 
the end of 2004’162.  
 
However, after the referendum for the Annan Plan in the island it was demonstrated 
to the whole world that Greeks were not actually intending to solve the dispute or 
integrate the whole island. They were only trying to just manipulate the EU and the 
world by talking diplomatically and addressing how much they wanted to solve the 
dispute on the basis of Annan Plan, an internationally acceptable plan. Yet ‘the 
Greek Cypriot electorate, by a margin of three to one, rejected the settlement 
proposal; on the Turkish Cypriot side, it was approved by a margin of two to one. 
Since the plan required approval on both sides, the Cyprus problem remains 
unsettled’163. 
 
These results reflected how much the Greek Cypriots and the Greek government 
wanted to solve the dispute on the basis of the Annan Plan. The only real motivation 
behind this power politics was that the Greek government wanted Greek Cyprus as a 
new member state of the EU we can thereby see clearly the visible hand of Greece in 
the island. Turkey has indeed done more than enough to fulfill the EU criteria but 
will her efforts improve its membership chance and in turn improve its relations with 
EU? Günter Verheugen addressed the issue as such in his speech on 17.06.2004 at a 
conference. He stressed that ‘the issue we face is therefore not whether Turkey can 
be a member of the EU, but whether and when negotiations on the accession of 
                                                 
162 http://www.turkishpress.com/specials/2003review/greece.asp 
163 http://www.tech4peace.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=4411 
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Turkey can begin. The Copenhagen a political criterion sets out the condition that 
needs to be met. The sequence is clear. First meeting the political criteria and then 
negotiations’164. Mr. Verhaeugen makes it clear that the EU leaders should not 
debate about EU membership to the EU yet because it s far too early to discuss this 
matter.  
 
The December 2004 decisions of EU will be another historical turning point for EU-
Turkish relations since the Turkish AKP government and many Turkish citizens has 
attached too much importance to becoming a EU member. If the EU rejects to give a 
date to Turkey for negotiations then the AKP government will lose quite a few votes 
from the public in the coming elections. This would in turn effect the governments 
relations with the EU if they still mange to come to government they might no longer 
be as liberal democratic as they demonstrate to be. They may decide to follow 
another course and become Islamic fundamentalists as they were before. Thus, EU if 
they are smart enough, wrote the Forbes magazines owner that owns one of the 
leading business magazine in the world, should not hesitate to give a date to Turkey. 
‘Turkey began taking serious steps to liberalize and strengthen its economy 20 years 
ago. In every sector, modern companies have adopted cutting-edge technologies, 
developed many best-practice operations, and managed to attain real economies of 
scale’. Turkey has not only improved its economy but also has Europeanized most of 
its legislation in a very short time period and is willing to apply the laws in 
                                                 
164http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/04/309&format=HTML&ag
ed=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en 
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practice165. Thus, EU should go on playing the ‘old game’ to Europeanize Turkey’s 
security policy, Turkish legislation and economy. 
 
5.3. Greek security: CFSP and the ESDP 
What are the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union? 
Moreover, how is it different from the European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) and where does Greece stand in this ESDP? Furthermore, what is the so-
called ‘European Army’ are there any parallels to the NATO forces? 
‘CFSP is the whole set of actions undertaken by the EU in order to make itself active 
on the world scene, not just as an economic power, but as a single and independent 
political entity as well; in order to be active as a powerful and credible political entity 
capable of facing the present-day international challenges as a world player who 
promotes, in every corner of the planet, the very fundamental principles upon which 
the EU itself is based: peace, international security, independence and integrity of the 
Union, promotion of international cooperation, democracy, rule of law, respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms’166. 
 
CFSP is not stagnant it is in contrast constantly evolving and ESDP is the security 
arm of it designed to support the CFSP goals. The main aim of the ESDP is to form a 
common security policy as stipulated in the Treaty European Union. The Treaty of 
Amsterdam includes the following additional steps. Firstly, it consists of the article 
                                                 
165 http://www.forbes.com/2003/12/23/1224mckinsey.html 
166 http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/eu_relations/keppa.html 
 77 
that stipulates the creation of the CFSP High Representative and the Policy Unit in 
the Secretariat. Secondly, it stipulates that the institutionalization of the ‘constructive 
abstention’ mechanism in order to facilitate the CFSP decision-making process. 
Lastly, it also stipulates a novel instrument so called the ‘common strategy’.   
The European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) were first mentioned in 
Maastricht. Article 17 of the Treaty stipulates that ‘The common foreign and security 
policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the 
progressive framing of a common defense policy, (…), which might lead to a 
common defense, should the European Council so decide’167. 
 
However, it limits itself in military as well as non-military crisis management, 
undertaking humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping operations and tasks of 
combat forces, including peacemaking. Furthermore, it was declared that the EU has 
committed itself to setting up, a 60,000- military force able to be deployed within 60 
days. This is the so-called ‘European Army’ of the EU that is up to now being 
established. 
 
Where does Greece stand in this CFSP and ESDP established by the EU? Greece 
seems to be sincerely supporting the dynamic process and Greece has actively 
participated in the entire evolutionary process of the EU over the last decade, from 
the adoption of the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice Treaties. The Greek 
                                                 
167 http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/eu_relations/keppa_epaa/keppa.html See for detailed 
information   
Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union:  
“Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks,  
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including  
peacemaking.”  
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government believed that it would be for the Greek advantage if the EU could form 
‘a credible and strong foreign and security policy, which should have at its disposal 
the necessary institutional framework, coherence and unity, along with vital 
operational tools in order to underpin the role of the EU on the international 
scene’168. 
 
The stronger the EU foreign and security policy the Greek security in the region will 
be automatically protected without any Greek effort. Greece would be more secure 
when it had the so-called ‘European Army’ at its disposal. Greece's main objectives 
include the eradication of current loci of conflicts especially with its close neighbor 
Turkey. This is why it always stresses the need of ‘the prevention of potential crises 
and the consolidation of a climate of security, the implementation of the fundamental 
principles of international law and the strengthening of the rule of law, and the 
protection of human and minority rights’169. 
 
This is at the time being the most effective way for Greece to feel secure in the 
region because its military force is not capable of dealing with any conflict in the 
region. When it comes to ESDP measures there are many Greek priorities in this 
field. Firstly, Greece would like to improve the military capabilities to such a degree 
                                                 
168 http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/eu_relations/keppa_epaa/keppa.html 
169 http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/eu_relations/keppa_epaa/keppa.html 
See Petersberg declaration of June 1992. Therefore,  
the current description of the missions that the EU may undertake is perhaps  
antiquated and not tailored to the EU needs.  
The Convention has adopted a new definition, which will have to be confirmed  
or reformed by the Intergovernmental Conference.  
Article 40.1 of the draft Constitutional Treaty adopted by the Convention  
(July 2003): “The common security and defense policy shall be an integral part of the common  
foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing  
on assets civil and military. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for  
peacekeeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance  
with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be  
undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States.” 
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that will allow the Union to undertake, autonomously or not, operations covering the 
full range of the Petersberg tasks. Secondly, the Greek government would like the 
consolidation and further development and deepening of the EU’s co-operation with 
NATO. It encourages the NATO and EU to work together. Firstly, Greece would like 
the EU to assure access to NATO's planning capabilities, secondly, presumption of 
availability of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets, thirdly, it 
desires the EU to identify a range of European command options, including the role 
of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), last but not least, it 
would wish that the EU further adapt to NATO's defense planning system so as to 
incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations. In 
other words, Greece does not wish EU to challenge NATO forces rather it would like 
both of them to work hand in hand for the security of the Balkans and its own 
neighborhood170. Thirdly, the Greek government sees it necessary for EU to advance 
and make necessary adjustments that would be necessary to be made in ESDP crisis 
management procedures and EU’s crisis management mechanisms. Fourthly, it 
believes the EU should complete necessary institutional framework for the 
functioning of the ESDP mechanism by finalizing and adopting general and 
operational concepts that are needed. Finally, the Greek government believes that the 
enhancement and development of relations with third countries and especially with 
the EU's potential partners, especially with Russia in light of her recent integration 
into Europe's security structure together with a hand in hand the dialogue and the 
strengthening of ties with the countries of the Mediterranean and the Balkans at the 
same time is necessary. Yet as stated above Greece's vision for the future focuses 
                                                 
170 http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/eu_relations/keppa_epaa/epaa.html 
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heavily on the development of a CFSP/ESDP, especially through the inclusion of a 
mutual assistance clause in the Treaty of the Union171. 
 
The recent Iraqi crisis has demonstrated that the CFSP is framework is not only slow 
but also ineffective, in addition it also show that lots of progress needs to be made in 
order to talk about a common security and foreign policy for the EU. In other words, 
pointed out to an emphasis to the need for a credible CFSP/ESDP. The Iraqi crisis 
has, moreover, assisted ‘to bring to the surface the underlying truth that despite 
declarations, presidency conclusions, memoranda, reports and political commitments 
to the contrary, Europe speaks with a multitude of voices in matters of foreign and 
security policy’172.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
171 Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Greece's Strategic Objectives in the Convention on the Future of  
Europe, online article 
172 http://www.fornet.info/CFSPannualreports/GREECE%202003.pdf 
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CONCLUSION 
 
As Constantine Karamanlis stated in his speech in 1981 after the Greek accession to 
the EC, Athens was “convinced that national independence will be consolidated for 
all parties concerned within the framework of European solidarity; that democratic 
liberties will be strengthened; that economic expansion will be accelerated and that, 
with the co-operation of all, social and economic progress would become a common 
asset”. These were the three main motivations behind the Greek desire to join the 
EC. The motivations of candidate countries, mainly the Balkan countries, are similar 
to those of Greece. All of the candidate countries would like to strengthen 
democratic liberties and trigger social and economic process in their countries.  
 
However, the conditions are not quite similar because the EU is no longer a 
community that Greece joined in 1981. EC was a community established by the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the real motivation behind it was to provide free 
movement of goods, services, persons and capital between member countries. On the 
other hand, the Treaty of Maastrict led to the creation of the EU in 1992. With this 
Treaty the community became a union, not only a monetary one but also a political 
union. In 1993, this union established the Copenhagen Criteria and these criteria’s 
were formulated to give the EU a guideline on which member countries should fulfill 
political and economic conditions to join the EU. The EU, agreeing that ‘the 
associated countries in central and eastern Europe that so desire shall become 
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members of the European Union’. Thus, enlargement was no longer a question of 
‘if’, but ‘when’. The EU could not accept all candidate countries into the club at the 
same time and had to make a timetable for each to join in according to which one 
was more significant to the EU strategically and economically.   
 
Before when Greece joined the EC, there were no such criteria and the only 
condition to be a full member was to be a democratic country and, of course EC was 
willing and able to access the candidate country willing to join in. After the Cold 
War the parameters and conditions have changed. For instance, the EU was formed 
in 1992 straight after the break up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 
Former communists needed to join the EU in order to strengthen their democracy and 
improve their economies. Although Turkey was not one of these countries, it also 
desired to be part of the EU with the same motivation. These countries wanted to 
follow the course of the Greek case and improve their democracy and at the same 
time improve their economy as Greece did after it joined the EU club.  
 
The only thing these countries missed out was that when Greece became a EC 
member, the EU was willing and able to finance the underdeveloped and unequal 
member countries economy’s and the candidate countries such as Spain, Greece and 
Portugal received enormous amounts of structural funds to improve their economies 
and minimize the negative effects of the customs union when these countries had to 
lower the trade barriers and start competing with multinational companies of the EU 
member states.    
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The second enlargement had been solely for economic reasons; Britain, Denmark 
and Ireland were accepted because they were economically strong. However, 
countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey were asked to join in only for 
political reasons. Yet the Ecevit government in Turkey refused to join in at the time. 
The world structure was bipolar: there were two camps, NATO and Warsaw Pact. 
International arena was not the same as today, for instance, when unequal partners 
such as Greece, Portugal and Spain were asked to join the EC; the Soviet Union was 
still a threat to EC members. These countries were accepted because of political 
reasons. In addition, EC did not want to leave out countries like Greece and Turkey 
outside. Moreover, it was neither a political union trying to form a political identity. 
When countries like Turkey applied to become a full member, the Cold war was over 
and there was no longer such a threat from Russia. Therefore, the EU had no rush in 
accepting these candidate countries in the EU. Hence, the EU asked them to fulfill 
the political and economic criteria before they joined in.  
 
The EU is an evolving and dynamic union and the conditions for the candidate 
countries are no longer as the Greek case. Moreover, the Treaty of Amsterdam that 
entered into force on 1 May 1999 brings us a good step closer to ‘the Europe of the 
citizens’. It enhanced citizen participation and a clearer orientation of the treaties to 
citizens’ concerns and needs have strengthened the EU's political identity. 
Furthermore, Treaty of Nice formulated the Protocol of enlargement, Protocol on the 
statute of the Court of Justice, and Protocol on the financial consequences of the 
expiry of the ECSC Treaty in 2001. In addition, the new draft Constitution of 
European Union was formulated in 2003 and signed by European member states 
leaders in 18 June 2004 this year. All these novelties have indeed changed the 
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conditions and parameters for the enlargement process. Thus, the conditions for the 
new candidate countries are totally different from the Greek case. Therefore, when 
we are analyzing and comparing the Greek case with the Turkish one or other 
candidate countries we need to be well aware of the newly formed obstacles.   
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: 
 
Table 1. Greek Attitudes towards the Unification vis-à-vis The EU as a Whole 
(1980-1990) In Percentage 
1980  1981  1981  1982  1982  1983  1983  1984  1984  1985  1985  1986  1986 
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 %       %      %      %      %     %      %      %      %      %       %      %      % 
GR      GR    GR     GR      GR     GR      GR      GR      GR       GR     GR     GR   GR 
COM COM COM COM COM COM COM COM  COM  COM  COM  COM COM 
For very much 
 33-29  30-26  36-31  29-26  36-26  31-29  40-31  28-25  32-30  34-35  27-28  35-32  38-36 
For to some extent                 
 26-43  30-43  29-43  29-45  27-44  30-45  29-44  29-46  35- 47  28-42  26-47 21-45  33-44 
Against to some extent        
12-9  12-10     7- 9    10 -10  8-10    6 -8    5  -7   11 -10   9  -8    9  -7   15 -9    14- 7    11 - 8   
Against very   much 
 11- 4 13 - 6    8 -4     7 - 5    7 -4     6 -3    5  -3     9  -4    7 -3     6 -3     8  -4    4  - 3    3 -3 
No reply             
18-15 15-15  20 -13 25-14  22-16  27-15  20-15  23-15  17-12  23-13   24-12   26 -13  15-19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1987   1987   1988   1988   1989   1989   1989   1990   1990   
 %      %        %       %       %      %       %       %        %                         
GR     GR     GR    GR    GR     GR     GR     GR       GR     
 COM COM COM COM COM COM COM COM COM 
 
For very much       
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 35   37   37  32  33  26  44  28  40  29  44  29   54   36   57   35   48  32 
For to some extent     
 29   40   32  46  32  47  34  50  38  50  31  47  28   42    24   45   32  48 
Against to some extent          
14    8     9    8    9   11   6    9    8    9   5     9    3     8      5     8     5     8 
Against very much      
  6    4      5    3    5    4    2    5    2    5   2     3    3     3      3     3     3     3 
No reply      
 16   11   17   11  21   12  14   8   12  14  8   12    9   18    12    12   11  11 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer: Trends (1974-1990) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: 
 
Table 2 
Europe’s Winners… 
 
  Central bank           Expected            Net 
       Profits           Profits            gain/loss 
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France         649                       4,377               3,728 
Italy      2,266                       4,081               1,815 
Britain      2, 313                      3,952               1,639 
Portugal             5                        476                   471 
Greece          155                        515                   360 
 
Europe’s losers… 
 
Austria        1,206                     592                    -614  
Denmark        1,069                     438                    -631 
Spain         3,472                  2,279                 -1,193 
Germany        8,425                  5,806                 -2,619 
Sweden        3,511                     747                 -2,764 
Total EU15      25,747                25,747                        nil 
 
After EMU, if distributed in proportion to EMI shareholders 
Source: Central Banking 
 
Appendix C: 
 
Table 3  
Growth of Greek agricultural activity by enterprise prior and post accession 
 
Corp area/livestock units (%) 
Enterprises       1965        1980         1984     Pre-entry change 1966/80       Post entry change 
 97 
Corps          100.0    100.0           100.0                   %                              % 
Cereals      43.6        33.3           28.1                 -23.6                            -15 
Vegetable  4.6         5.3              5.9                   +15.2                           +11 
Industrial  9.7          8.4             12.2                  -13.4                            +45 
corps 
Fodder    15.7          22.9          23.1                   +45.9                          +0.9 
Fruit trees1.2           2.0            2.2                     +66.7                          +10 
Citrus trees1.4         1.5           1.9                      +7.1                            +20 
Olive trees 15.8       20.4           21.1                 +29.1                           +3.0 
Vineyards  8.0          6.2             5.5                  -22.6                             -14 
 
Livestock 100.0        100.0         100.0                 100.0                          100.0 
Bovines    34.0          26.3          22. 6                  -22.6                             -14 
Sheep       32. 1         30.1          30.6                    -6.2                              +1.6 
Goats        15.9          17.8          17.9                 +11.9                              +0.9 
Pigs           9.1           14.8          15.8                 +62.6                              +64.9 
Poultry      8.9           11.0          13.1                 +23.6                              +19 
Total    2,444.2      2,678.0     2,679.0                +9.6                                +0.1 
Source: Zioganas, 1998.  
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